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PART ONE
Involving as it does the entire liability of the taxpayer, the charac-
teristic vagueness of the jurisdictional provisions has implications
which are more far reaching than vagueness in other areas of tax
law.'
On February 24, 1959, the United States Supreme Court decided
the companion cases of Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota and Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc.2 This de-
cison raised many doubts in the business community as to the ade-
quacy of the constitutional limitations upon the power of a state to tax
1. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXA-
TION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 14801.
2. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
3. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 359 U.S. 28 (March
2, 1959), dismissing appeal & denying cert. to 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958); E.T. &
W.N.C. Transp. Co. v. Currie, 359 U.S. 28 (March 2, 1959), a!f'g per curiam 248 N.C.
560, 104 S.E.2d 403 (1958). These two cases were closely followed by the summary
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the net income of a multistate business enterprise. The Court's sum-
mary action in two other state income tax cases less than 1 week later3
gave rise to additional demands that the taxing powers of the states be
limited by federal legislation.4 As a result, Public Law 86-272, the
Interstate Income Act, was passed and signed into law by President
Eisenhower on September 14, 1959. 5 The new law was designed to
prohibit state income taxation in situations for which the business com-
munity was most apprehensive at the time.
6
The substantive provisions of Public Law 86-272,7 admittedly
a stopgap measure, 8 were supplemented by title 2 of the act. Title 2
required the Senate Finance and House Judiciary Committees, jointly
or separately, to undertake
full and complete studies of all matters pertaining to taxation by
the States of income derived within the States from the conduct of
business activities which are exclusively in furtherance of inter-
state commerce or which are a part of interstate commerce, for
the purpose of recommending to the Congress proposed legislation
providing uniform standards to be observed by the States in impos-
ing income taxes on income so derived.9
Legislative recommendations based upon the authorized studies were
advanced. While numerous bills restricting or defining state taxing power
have been introduced in Congress during the past 5 years, none have
been enacted. 10 Thus, Public Law 86-272 represents the only federal
decision in International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 359 U.S. 984 (May 4, 1959), denying
cert. to 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958).
4. E.g., W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAxEs To OTHER STATES 6.3-.9 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as BEAMAN]; Sanford, Book Review, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1207 (1965).
5. 73 Stat. 555.
6. S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2548, 2549.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964).
8. BEAMAN, supra note 4, at 6.11.
9. Pub. L. No. 86-272, tit. 2, § 201, 73 Stat. 555 (1959). The business com-
munity's apprehensions were later reignited by the Supreme Court decision in Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), involving minimum jurisdictional standards for use
tax jurisdiction. Again, Congress responded. Public Law 87-17 was enacted, expand-
ing the study directed to be made under Public Law 86-272 to "all matters pertaining to
the taxation of interstate commerce by the States, territories, and possessions of the
United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any
political or taxing subdivisions of the foregoing." Act of Apr. 7, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-
17, 75 Stat. 41 (1961) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964)).
10. Over 4 years of hearings and study conducted under the auspices of the House
Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce led to the publication
in 1964 and 1965 of its four volume report titled State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1. Legislative recommendations by the Special Sub-
committee's parent, the House Committee on the Judiciary, are contained in volume four
of the reports. Based upon these recommendations, H.R. 11798, the first of many mea-
sures designed to further regulate various forms of state taxation of multistate businesg,
was introduced in the 89th Congress in October 1965. After further extensive hearings
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statutory intrusion to date into the field of state income taxation of
multistate business."
during the first quarter of 1966, an amended measure, H.R. 16491, embodying some of
the changes recommended during those hearings, was introduced and reported favor-
ably by the Committee on the Judiciary, but failed to receive full consideration of the
House before adjournment of the 89th Congress. HousE COMM. ON THE JDICIARY,
INTERSTATE TAXATION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 91-279, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).
The 90th and 91st Congress saw the introduction and partial modification of similar
bills, and although each passed the House of Representatives, both reached the Senate
too late in their respective sessions to receive consideration by the latter body. H.R.
2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 7906, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
11. Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented, in dissenting in Northwestern States, that
"today's decision will stimulate, if indeed it does not compel, every State of the Union,
which has not already done so, to devise a formula of apportionment to tax the net in-
come of enterprises carrying on exclusively interstate commerce." Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 473-74 (1959). He may well have
announced the course of the response of state governments, but Public Law 86-272,
the hearings and report of the House Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Inter-
state Commerce, and the introduction, beginning in October 1965, of H.R. 11798 and its
progeny were the real stimulus for state action.
The statutory revision of state net income tax income allocation and apportionment
formulas has been effected by the adoption in 20 states and the District of Columbia of
the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). Keesling &
Warren, California's Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 5 U.C.L.A.L
REv. 156, 158 (1968).
In California the passage of Public Law 86-272 and the continuing congressional in-
terest in the problems of state taxation of interstate enterprise had no little effect in
spurring on adoption of UDITPA substantially as proposed by the Uniform Commis-
sioners. Cal. Stat. 1966, ch. 2, § 7, at 117-90 (codified at CAL. REv. & TAx CODE §§
25120-39). Compare the statements of California's tax administrators in Hearings on
H.R. 11798 & Companion Bills, Before a Special Subcomm. on State Taxation of Inter-
State Commerce of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91,
130-31 (1966). See generally Keesling & Warren, supra.
Partially in response to the outcry of business and Congress that the difference in
definition of the net income tax base among the states created substantial accounting
and filing problems, especially for small multistate companies, the number of states us-
ing more or less the Internal Revenue Code definition of income for tax purposes has
risen from 9 in the early 1960's to 23 plus the District of Columbia as of mid-1970.
Compare H. R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1, at 256 with CCH STATE TAx Gump,
ALL STATE UNrr 1043 (1970).
In the jurisdictional area, Public Law 86-272 seems rather to have had the
effect of taking away the states' incentive to develop more definite and equitable statu-
tory minimum jurisdictional standards covering all areas of multistate business. See,
e.g., comments by Martin Huff, infra note 283.
The introduction of further congressional legislation in 1965 resulted in the draft-
ing, under the auspices of the Council of State Governments, of The Multistate Tax
Compact, as of mid-1970 adopted, or conditionally adopted, by 21 states. P-H STATE &
LOcAL TAxEs, F1 5101-08, 5801-6312 (1970). The compact represents one of the
states' alternatives to further federal encroachment on their taxing prerogatives. The
compact deals most immediately with income, capital stock, gross receipts, sales and use
taxes and provides for study, recommendations and certain services by the Multistate
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This article will analyze one of the central constitutional questions
not fully answered by the Northwestern States decision, nor by subse-
quent federal or state legislative action: What "minimum contacts
are sufficient to satisfy due process requirements for the valid imposi-
tion of a state tax on or measured by the corporate 2 net income of a
foreign,' 3  out-of-state based corporation?' 4  The analysis of this
Tax Commission that could be applied to other state and local taxes also. The compact
is managed by the Multistate Tax Commission, composed of one member from each
party state. Id.
12. While analogous criteria are applied to unincorporated foreign firms or in-
dividuals having business or income contacts with the potential taxing state, most recent
cases involving questions of state income tax jurisdiction concern corporate rather than
individual taxpayers. But see Alaska v. Petronia, 69 Wash. 2d 460, 418 P.2d 755
(1966).
13. For this discussion, a foreign corporation is one organized or incorporated un-
der the laws of a state other than California or under the laws of a foreign country.
14. This article concerns itself with that type of corporate net income which was
at issue both in Northwestern States and in the subsequent congressional intervention
via Public Law 86-272-net income from multistate business activity. The distinction
between income from activities in the course of the taxpayer's trade or business ("busi-
ness income") and income from nonbusiness or investment activities ("nonbusiness in-
come") has received explicit recognition in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act (UD1TPA), supra note 11 and in the uniform regulations proposed there-
under by the Committee on Uniform Income Tax Regulations of the National Associa-
tion of Tax Administrators on November 23, 1970. These regulations contain a lengthy
proposal and a multitude of examples attempting to distinguish between business and
nonbusiness income for purposes of allocating or apportioning income among the states.
See Proposed Regulation 1, STATEMENT OF PROPOSED REGULATIONS 1-11 (1970).
Even though UDITPA, adopted by California in 1966, is a statute prescribing rules
for allocation and apportionment rules rather than jurisdictional rules, Franchise Tax
Board personnel have informally indicated that they would use UDITPA guidelines in
resolving jurisdictional questions. See note 49 inIra. The regulations indicate that "in-
come of the taxpayer is business income unless clearly classifiable as non-business income
.." and note that labels "such as interest, rent, royalties, capital gains" will not control
the determination of such status. The determinative test seems to be whether or not the
property from the ownership, renting, sale or use of which, income is derived was em-
ployed or recently employed in relation to the taxpayer's one or more principal business
activities. See also Sarver & Hynes, Proposal for a Uniform Regulation on Business
Income Under UDITPA, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 31 (1970).
If an out-of-state company has sufficient in-state business activity to give the state
tax jurisdiction, then investment income will technically pose only an allocation and not
a jurisdictional problem. But if the taxing state is not able to base its jurisdiction upon
the out-of-state company's business activities, or if the out-of-state company conducts
no business activities in the taxing state, then the question of jurisdiction based on the
out-of-state company's derivation of nonbusiness or investment income from a taxing
state arises. Because of the existence of definite rules defining real or fictitious location
of property, jurisdiction based on receipt of nonbusiness or investment income is gen-
erally much more readily determinable and, in any case, involves substantially different
concepts of territorial presence than jurisdiction claimed on the basis of business activi-
ties within or touching the potential taxing state. A discussion of these concepts is be-
yond the scope of this article.
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question will be three-fold: First, present constitutional guidelines and
California's conformance to such guidelines will be examined, and a
theory of current constitutional nexus requirements will be suggested.
Second, California's net corporate income tax jurisdictional
rules, and their concrete applications, will be discussed in light of the
impact of Public Law 86-272 and legislation at the state level. The
emphasis will be on the significant problems of interpretation sur-
rounding the application of Public Law 86-272 to which state tax
administrators and courts have addressed themselves during the past
decade.
Finally, because both California and federal law have largely
ignored the important quantitative aspect of constitutional minimum
nexus guidelines suggested by the Northwestern States line of Su-
preme Court decisions, an alternative which incorporates such a quan-
titative minimum in a practical, visible and understandable manner
will be suggested as a preferable solution to the problem of establishing
minimum jurisdictional standards for state net income taxation of the
multistate corporation.
I. Constitutional Minimum Nexus Guidelines
for State Income Tax Jurisdictional Rules
There must be some play in the joints of the constitutional struc-
ture if it is to stand the stresses of a changing civilization. . . . We
do better to adapt our minor constitutional tolerances to the needs
of the times through the case-by-case judicial process.
If the Supreme Court did not exist, . . . we should have had to
create it much in its present form. Law making is a complex and
important power, much too important to leave solely to legisla-
tors.1
One thing is certain after Northwestern States and its immediate
progeny.1" Even though the income of a foreign, out-of-state based
corporation is derived entirely from activities wholly in furtherance
of interstate commerce, constitutional barriers no longer exist to pre-
vent taxation of such income, so long as the corporation's in-state busi-
ness activities have some regular, systematic and substantial connection
with and physical presence within the taxing state.1" Less certain
is the precise point at which the in-state activities of the foreign, out-
of-state based corporation would be considered to have fallen below
15. Book Review, 5 HARv. J. LEGIS. 305, 309 (1968).
16. Cases cited note 12 supra.
17. Northvocstern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959);
cases cited note 12 supra.
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that level of regular, systematic, and substantial connection at which,
to borrow the Court's language, the corporation was "sufficiently in-
volved in local events to forge 'some definite link, some minimum con-
nection' sufficient to satisfy due process requirements."' 8
Neither Northwestern States, nor the March 2, 1959, Supreme
Court per curiam affirmance in E. T. & W. N. L. Transportation Co.
v. Currie,9 nor the Court's dismissal of appeal and denial of certiorari
in Brown-Forman20 presented the proper occasion for the establish-
ment of standards of minimally sufficient nexus. The Court wasted
few words in disposing of the nexus issue in Northwestern States; such
summary disposition, however, meant only that the Court found no
minimum nexus question on the facts presented. It did not mean that
such a question would not be proper in a different case. Thus, none
of these three decisions warrant the conclusion stated by the Chairman
of the Select Committee on Small Business at the opening of its hear-
ings on April 8, 1959, "that the Court has ruled finally that a State
may levy and collect taxes from out-of-state businesses which have
any commercial dealings at all in that state.'
Northwestern States did suggest guidelines as to the various kinds of
contacts with the taxing state which would be required to satisfy con-
stitutional due process requirements for the valid imposition of a tax.
In addition to requiring a reasonable conceptual relationship between
the tax and the object or activity which is the subject of the tax,22 the
Northwestern States Court spoke of taxpayers being "sufficiently involved
in local events" and of conducting "substantial income-producing activ-
ity in the taxing States"2 to point out respectively the local quality and
the substantial quantity of income-producing activity or involvement
necessary to forge the sufficient nexus.
A. The Qualitative Nexus Requirement
Qualitative sufficiency of nexus requires "local" activity or in-
18. 358 U.S. at 465, citing Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
19. 359 U.S. 28 (1959), aff'g 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403 (1958).
20. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 359 U.S. 28 (1959),
dismissing appeal & denying cert. to 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958).
21. SENATE SELECT CoMM. ON SMALL BusiNEss, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., STATE
TAxATiON ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE 2 (Comm. Print 1959) (remarks of Sen. Spark-
man, Apr. 8, 1959).
22. As a preliminary requirement, the Court seems to suggest the necessity of
both a logical and practical relationship between the attempted tax levy and the activi-
ties of the corporation within the taxing state. 358 U.S. at 452, 464.
23. Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
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volvement. The practical question is, what manifestation of local ac-
tivity or involvement will satisfy this requirement?
Certainly the existence of a local sales or administrative office
for the efficient handling of the solicitation of orders for sales of its
products, and for the processing and forwarding of such orders for ac-
ceptance and filling from out-of-state stocks of goods, would satisfy the
requirement; for this would be similar to the office operated by the
Northwestern States Portland Cement Company. Also, the existence
of a "sales-service office" would satisfy the requirement; for this would
be similar to the one in the Stockham Valves case. But Northwestern
States was hardly necessary to sustain the constitutionality of tax juris-
diction based on these kinds of local activity; the Court's per curiam
affirmance of West Publishing Co. v. McColgan24 had already es-
tablished as much.
Although related promotional or customer service activities con-
ducted by the corporations' employees together with the maintenance
of in-state corporate sales offices certainly added to the flavor of the
taxpayers' physical presence, in this writer's opinion regular and
systematic solicitation activity conducted by local representatives is
by itself sufficient to satisfy the qualitative nexus requirement of local
activity or involvement. In Northwestern States the Court's opinion
indicates that the qualitative nexus requirement was satisfied in each
case by the in-state salesmen's regular and systematic course of soli-
citation of orders.25 The Court's denial of certiorari in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Fontenot26 constitutes further evidence that the
Court's majority intended to adopt regular and systematic solicitation
activity as the constitutional standard for state net income tax jurisdic-
tion over foreign, out-of-state based corporate enterprise. That case
was tried and affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court on the stipu-
lation of fact that International Shoe's "sole activity within . . . [the
taxing state] consists of the regular and systematic solicitation of or-
ders for its product by fifteen salesmen."' 7 Thus, personal in-state
solicitation activity must have been considered sufficient by the United
States Supreme Court to satisfy the "activity in the taxing state" or
"involvement in local events" qualitative aspect of the constitutional
24. 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, af'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946). "The
record shows without conflict that plaintiff engages in substantial income-producing ac-
tivities in California. It has local offices here .... " Id. at 713, 166 P.2d at 866.
25. See 358 U.S. at 460-61.
26. 359 U.S. 984 (1959), denying cert. to 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958).
27. 236 La. at 279, 107 So. 2d at 640.
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nexus guidelines suggested by Northwestern States. The question still
remains, however, whether the local activity or involvement test would
require some physical as opposed to purely economic involvement.
1. The Requirement of Presence: Economic v. Physical Presence
While the presence of an out-of-state corporation's property in
the state, or the presence of its employees engaged in solicitation ac-
tivities, was the precise form of "involvement in local events" in North-
western States, such presence of property or employees may not logi-
cally seem necessary in situations where the corporation's income pro-
duction depends less heavily on the efforts of real or human capital
present within the taxing state. Nevertheless, some local physical pres-
ence has generally been required to satisfy constitutional qualitative
nexus standards.28
a) ECONOMIC PRESENCE
The opinion that arguably has gone the furthest in interpreting
Northwestern States as a carte blanche for aggressive state tax adminis-
trators was written by the Oregon Supreme Court in American Refrig-
erator Transit Co. v. State Tax Commission.29 The taxpayer (ART)
owned and was in the business of renting or leasing railroad refrigera-
tor cars to railroads for use in their transportation service business.
ART itself was not a common carrier, issued no bills of lading, had
no dealings with shippers and published no tariffs of rates for shippers.
ART had no rental agreements with railroads operating in Oregon, nor,
under the interchange procedures used by railroads, did it have control
over the presence of its cars in Oregon. No rental agreements or
leases were executed in Oregon, nor were cars delivered to junction
points in Oregon.
Under the applicable Oregon net income tax jurisdictional statute,
the Tax Commission asserted that ART had "income derived from
sources within [Oregon]" since ART's income included "income from
tangible . . .property located or having a situs in [Oregon]." 30  The
Oregon Tax Court found the contrary on the ground that insufficient
nexus existed for the imposition of the tax."1
28. E.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc., v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753
(1967).
29. 238 Ore. 340, 395 P.2d 127 (1964).
30. Id. at 343, 395 P.2d at 129.
31. Id. at 343-44, 395 P.2d at 129.
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The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the trial court in an opinion
which noted that
[t]he connection between the taxing state and the out-of-state tax-
payer necessary to establish nexus is essentially an economic
rather than a physical relationship. The theory is that a state is
free to exact a reasonable tribute from those using its economic
resources.
[T]he nexus exists whenever the corporation takes advantage of
the economic milieu within the state to realize a profit.
32
Since the taxpayer's property was present in the taxing state, per-
haps the quoted remarks were unnecessary as a basis for the holding.
The Oregon Court recognized the narrower "presence of property"
ground upon which tax jurisdiction could have been based,33 as well as
the need for imposing some requirement of immediacy or directness in
the use by the taxpayer of the state's economic milieu. 34  Neverthe-
less, the Oregon Supreme Court continued with further dicta as to the
extent of Oregon's taxing jurisdiction:
Nexus may be found even where neither property nor personnel of
the taxpayer is employed within the taxing state if it can be said
that the state substantially contributes to the production of the tax-
payer's income. Thus, apart from Federal Legislation [such as
Public Law 86-272] it would seem to us that income derived from
the sale of goods in Oregon by a non-resident corporation relying
entirely upon radio or television advertising would be taxable in
this state.35
b. PHYSICAL PRESENCE
Whatever the worth of the Oregon Court's dictum in American
Refrigerator Transit in terms of logic and vision of possible future tech-
nical innovations which would make physical nexus an inadequate
standard, 6 any implication that jurisdiction to tax a foreign, out-of-
state based corporation requires only an economic rather than a phy-
sical involvement goes beyond current constitutional restrictions on al-
lowable state tax jurisdictional reach. The necessity of some non-
trivial physical rather than economic local involvement was clearly
stated by the United States Supreme Court in National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue.
37
32. Id. at 346, 395 P.2d at 130 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 349, 395 P.2d at 131-32.
34. id. at 347, 395 P.2d at 130-31.
35. Id. 395 P.2d at 131.
36. Id. at 346, 395 P.2d at 130.
37. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). That the case involved the question of jurisdiction to
require an out-of-state seller to make use tax collections, rather than a question of net in-
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In National Bellas Hess Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for a six-
man majority, denied Illinois jurisdiction to require use tax collections
on mail order sales to Illinois residents from a Delaware mail order
house domiciled in Missouri. The out-of-state seller neither owned
nor rented property, nor maintained any office, warehouse or any other
place of business, nor any agent, salesman, canvasser, solicitor or any
other representative in Illinois, nor did it advertise on any Illinois
broadcast media or in any Illinois publications. Its only contacts with
Illinois were biannual mailings of the company's catalogue to active or
recent customers, supplemented by occasional flyers. Orders for goods
were received by mail and filled from the company's Missouri plant
by mail or common carrier. The Court noted:
The case in this Court which represents the furthest constitutional
reach to date of a State's power to deputize an out-of-state re-
tailer as its collection agent for a use tax is Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,
362 U.S. 207, 80 S.Ct. 619, 4 L.Ed.2d 660. There we held
that Forida could constitutionally impose upon a Georgia seller the
duty of collecting a state use tax upon the sale of goods shipped
to customers in Florida. In that case the seller had "10 whole-
salers, jobbers, or 'salesmen' conducting continuous local solicitation
in Florida and forwarding the resulting orders from that State to
Atlanta for shipment of the ordered goods." 363 U.S., at 211,
80 S.Ct., at 621.
But the Court has never held that a State may impose the
duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only
connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or
the United States mail....
In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax
burdens on National in this case, we would have to repudiate totally
the sharp distinction which [the Court's prior] decisions have
drawn between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or
property within a State, and those who do no more than com-
municate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier
as part of a general interstate business. But this basic distinc-
tion, which until now has been generally recognized by the state
taxing authorities, is a valid one, and we decline to obliterate it.38
The "basic distinction" drawn by the majority between out-of-
come tax jurisdiction, does not detract from its relevance to the net income tax jurisdic-
tional area. Jurisdiction to require use tax collection has trevelled a parallel constitu-
tional path to income tax jurisdictional requirements. In fact, use tax collection cases
such as General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944), and Miller
Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), have provided much cannon fodder for the
Court's volleys in developing income tax jurisdictional standards and for state courts in
upholding state claims of income tax jurisdiction. Most commentators have liberally
employed use tax cases in explaining and interpreting constitutional developments in the
income tax and in other state tax areas. E.g., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81
HARv. L. REV. 213 (1968).
38. 386 U.S. at 757-58.
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state sellers with retail outlets, solicitors or property within the state
and those who do no more than communicate with in-state customers
by mail or common carrier was totally rejected by Mr. Justice Fortas,
speaking for himself, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas. These
dissenters found no meaningful distinction between Scripto and Bellas
Hess. 9  They completely ignored the physical aspect of local activity
or involvement and strongly urged the adoption of what, in fact, would
be the economic nexus standard of the above-quoted American Re-
frigerator Transit dictum. They stressed the existence of "large-scale,
systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation" of the taxing state's
consumer market and the "substantial, regular, and systematic" con-
duct of business in the taxing state as the factor determinative for
finding sufficiency of nexus.40
While a division does seem to exist within the Court, the rationale
requiring a nontrivial physical activity or involvement in local events
in order to fulfill the qualitative nexus requirement seems to have the
upper hand. One policy reason for continued adherence to a require-
ment of some nontrivial "physical" activity or involvement may be the
difficulty of defining the boundaries to purely economic involvement.
Another, albeit less realistic policy reason may be found in the
reference to the "controlling question" which the Court has repeat-
edly noted as underlying both the qualitative and the quantitative as-
pects of minimally sufficient nexus: namely, whether by "the practical
operation of [the] tax the state has exerted its [taxing] power in re-
lation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has
afforded, to benefits which it has conferred. . ... 1 Thus, state
governments can tax outsiders when the outsider takes advantage of
the constitutional right of access to local markets and uses in-state facil-
ities.4" But where the person accorded the commerce clause right of
access to local markets uses no facilities and receives no actual or po-
tential tangible protection of person, property or activity within the
would-be taxing state, there may be nothing for which the state will be
entitled to ask a return.43
39. id. at 764-65 (dissenting opinion).
40. Id. at 761-62.
41. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 465
(1959), quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
42. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758
(1967).
43. Id.
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2. California's Requirement of Physical Presence
California Franchise Tax Board Regulation 23040(b) has, since
its promulgation in 1952, provided that California will not claim
corporate income or franchise tax jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion selling goods to California customers pursuant to telephonic, tele-
graphic or mail orders or pursuant to orders taken by independent con-
tractors, where the corporation maintains no employees or stock of
goods in California and goods are shipped only by mail or common car-
rier to customers in this state.4" Although the constitutional ques-
tion of whether California could have obtained tax jurisdiction on the
basis of such activity may not have been settled at the time regulation
23040(b) was first promulgated, such activity now seems to be clearly
insufficient for establishing qualitative nexus because of the rule of
National Bellas Hess.45
The importance of this paragraph of regulation 23040(b) lies not
only in the early anticipation by California tax administrators of the
constitutionally necessary physical presence of the out-of-state corpora-
tion by virtue of in-state property or employees, but also in the clear
rejection of a purely economic nexus standard" of the type announced
by Oregon Supreme Court's dictum in American Refrigerator Tran-
sit.47  A "Nexus Questionnaire" was sent to state tax administrators
in 1963 by the House Special Subcommittee as part of its study leading
to the 1964-1965 Report. Responses by California's Franchise
Tax Board staff indicate that the above mentioned exemption from
California corporate income tax jurisdiction is not destroyed despite the
fact that (1) sales catalogues are mailed to prospective customers in
this state, or (2) the out-of-state seller's goods are exhibited at space
leased in this state occasionally and for short periods of time."
Conversations with Franchise Tax Board staff officials indicate
that such immunity from California net income taxation, despite mailing
44. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 18, ch. 3, subch. 3, Reg. 23040(b) (repealed Apr. 2, 1970).
Initially enacted in 1952, this regulation was enacted in another section of the code in
1960. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 18, ch. 3, subch. 3.5, Reg. 23040(b). Consequently, two iden-
tical regulations existed under separate subchapters from 1960 to 1970. The repeal of
the regulation in subchapter 3 did not affect the position of the Franchise Tax Board be-
cause of the continuing existence of the regulation in subchapter 3.5.
45. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
See text accompanying note 37 supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra.
47. American Refrigerator Transit v. State Tax COmm'n, 238 Ore. 340, 395 P.2d
127 (1964).
48. See 1 H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1, at 148-49.
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of catalogues or short-term in-state display of catalogues, continues
as effective board policy at this time.49 Such conversations further
indicate that any other type of in-state advertising which does not in-
volve the presence in California of the out-of-state corporation's em-
ployees or property will not be taken as a basis for asserting income
tax jurisdiction regardless of whether the advertisement appears in
national or local newspapers or periodicals, or on national or local
broadcast media. 0 This further confirms the notion that California
and constitutional law, as currently interpreted by Franchise Tax Board
staff personnel, require some in-state physical as opposed to purely
economic presence of the out-of-state seller for an assertion of Cali-
fornia corporate net income tax jurisdiction.
To a large extent the importance of this exemption from Califor-
nia's tax jurisdictional reach, where the only California "presence" of
the seller (aside from sales to customers in this state) is mail order,
telephonic or telegraphic solicitation, or public newsprint or broadcast
media advertising, may have become less important, especially in the
sale-of-goods area because of the existence of Public Law 86-272.51
Nevertheless, the existence of this exemption may have the effect of
providing strong taxpayer argument for similar exemption from Cali-
fornia tax jurisdiction in the area of personal services which an out-of-
state seller could render to California customers without the presence
of its property or employees in this state. "Remote control" rendering
of personal services may develop to a much more substantial extent in
the not-too-distant future as a result of improvements and innovations
in long-distance communication devices.
Suppose, for example, that technical improvements and produc-
tion economies make electronic transmission of documentary and "live"
visual information, via long-distance xerography and picture phones,
an everyday business reality. A Cambridge, Massachusetts, based
computer firm may then, from its home office, be able to consult with a
prospective California purchaser of its complex computer system on
all the special use requirements and specifications of the California pur-
chaser. It may also be able to direct and supervise by video phone
the California installation of its product by independent California
49. Informal comments of Franchise Tax Board legal and audit staff personnel
during office conference with this writer at Sacramento, California, on September 8,
1970 [hereinafter referred to as Informal commentsl. The positions taken by Franchise
Tax Board staff personnel at that meeting were confirmed in several subsequent discus-
sions with individual staff members.
50 Informal comments, supra note 49.
51. See text accompanying notes 117-99 infra.
[Vol. 221048 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
JURISDICTIONAL CONTACTS
engineers and conduct all the post-installation inspection activities.
Thus, the potential taxpayer could remain within the exemption of
regulation 23040(b). Franchise Tax Board personnel have inform-
ally noted that the regulation does not contemplate this sort of situation.
Nevertheless, under the regulation as now worded and under the
writer's theory of current constitutional minimum qualitative nexus
requirements, a taxpayer under similar circumstances may escape
California's tax jurisdictional reach.52
As technology further overcomes the burdens of effecting sales
of goods and services over long distances, and as state tax laws and
their administration and collection procedures become more uniform
and less burdensome, the Supreme Court may be asked to reexamine
its tradition-based decision in National Bellas Hess." The Court
may find it necessary to allow state tax jurisdiction to extend to situa-
tions where physical presence of the out-of-state seller of goods or
services is neither a requisite to the conduct of substantial local business
nor a bar to the nonburdensome imposition of taxes by the state of sale.
Until such time, the exemption from California tax reach under regula-
tion 23040(b), paragraph one, probably represents a fair and accurate
interpretation of California law.
B. The Quantitative Nexus Requirement
1. Substantiality: Continuous, Regular, Systematic
Turning to the second or quantitative aspect of minimally suffi-
cient nexus suggested by the Northwestern States decision-to the re-
quirement of substantiality of income-producing activity in the taxing
state or sufficiency of the involvement in local events therein-the
brevity of the Court's comments again requires an examination of the
facts underlying this and related decisions. The Court in Northwestern
States spoke of regular and systematic solicitation by Northwestern
States Portland Cement Company employees in Minnesota and their
regular and systematic taking and forwarding of those orders for out-
of-state approval; the Court also spoke of the regular solicitation, re-
ceipt and forwarding of orders for out-of-state approval, and promotion
of business and goodwill by Stockham's Georgia representative.
54
52. Informal comments, supra note 49.
53. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
54. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 454-56
(1959).
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Although not expressly mentioned, the continuous presence of the tax-
payer's employees in the respective taxing jurisdictions can be assumed.
The Court further alludes to "sales which are shown to be pro-
moted by vigorous and continuous sales compaigns through a central
office" in Northwestern States and a "largely identical . . . course
of conduct . . ." in Stockham.51 Regular, systematic and substan-
tial revenue producing activity was present in all cases upholding
state jurisdiction to tax which the Supreme Court considered in the
Northwestern States decision.16 The conduct described in the state
court opinions on which the Court subsequently refused to elaborate
was equally regular, systematic and revenue productive for the com-
panies involved.
57
Miller Bros. v. Maryland,58 cited by the Court in Northwestern
States without embellishment, may indicate the type of quantitative
insufficiency of local activity on the basis of which the Supreme Court
would continue to deny the existence of sufficient nexus. In Miller
Bros. the sales had been made at the seller's Delaware retail household
furniture store, both on a cash and on a credit basis, to customers, some
of whom were Maryland residents. The appellant would make de-
liveries to the home of his customers, including Maryland residents.
Some Delaware broadcast advertising and regular newspapers undoubt-
edly reached Maryland residents since both broadcasts and newspapers
had some audience and circulation in the neighboring state. Regular
mail circulars were sent to everyone who had purchased from the ap-
pellant and thus reached some Maryland residents. But no resident
agents or solicitors were maintained in Maryland; no telephone orders
were accepted; and no advertising was conducted in Maryland news-
papers or through Maryland broadcasting stations. Under the above
facts, 59 the Supreme Court held that Maryland did not have jurisdiction
to require that the out-of-state seller collect the Maryland use tax
on sales to Maryland residents.
If anything in the repeated language of the decisions does char-
55. Id. at 465.
56. See Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949); West Pub-
lishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) (here the occasion for taxability was not the derivation of income,
but rather the payment of wages; and it was this activity which was conducted syste-
matically and with sufficient regularity and substantiality); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney
Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
57. Cases cited note 12 supra.
58. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
59. Id. at 342-43.
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acterize quantitative substantiality, it is the idea of "vigorous and con-
tinuous sales campaigns,"6 "regular and systematic course of solicita-
tion,"61 "large-scale, systematic, and continuous solicitation and ex-
ploitation of the [taxing state's] consumer market,"62 the conduct of
"substantial, regular and systematic business"' 3 and "active and ag-
gressive operation."64  Of course, it need hardly be mentioned that
the entire formula of substantiality, regularity and systematicity of
in-state income-producing activity may have a different meaning for
different businesses. Nevertheless, it should not be too difficult in prac-
tice to contrast the notion of a regular and systematic in-state conduct
of activities, or involvement in local events, to the notion of "occa-
sional" and "incidental" activity or transactions which the Court as-
cribed to the protesting appellant's conduct in Miller Bros. v. Mary-
land.65
2. Substantiality: Amount of Revenue Derived from Taxing State
Evidence of large absolute amounts of in-state revenue as well
as large percentages of total company revenues allocable to in-state
activities may be important evidence in establishing quantitative sub-
stantiality of nexus. 66 Proportionately larger absolute amounts or per-
60. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 465
(1959).
61. Id. at 454.
62. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 761-62
(1967) (dissenting opinion).
63. Id. at 454 (dissenting opinion).
64. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 347 (1954).
65. Id.
66. With respect to the Cement Company's activities in Northwestern States, the
Court noted "almost half of the corporation's income is derived from the taxing State's
sales." Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 465
(1959). In E.T. & W.N.C. Transportation Co. v. Currie the North Carolina Supreme
Court noted that "the agreed stipulation of facts does not state ... the amount of money
[the taxpayer] receives in North Carolina for bringing in or carrying out freight. How-
ever, it would seem from a consideration of the entire agreed stipulation of facts that
... the money it collects in North Carolina in its business [is] considerable." 248 N.C.
560, 576, 104 S.E.2d 403, 414 (1958), affd, 359 U.S. 28 (1959). in Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, while the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected
the taxpayer's "belated contention [of deprivation] of due process" without comment
on the substantiality of taxpayer's activity in that state, the taxes assessed against the
appellant taxpayer alone amounted to almost $19,000 for a 5-year period. 234 La. 651,
658, 101 So. 2d 70, 72 (1958), appeal dismissed & cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
Even though the Louisiana Supreme Court made no mention of the fact in International
Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984
(1959), a Louisiana tax official pointed out that the International Shoe Company had
over $5,000,000 in Louisiana sales. Developments in the Law, 75 HARv. L. REv. 953,
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centages would probably be required to be shown for smaller com-
panies than for larger concerns to support the existence of quantitative
nexus. The policy reason for the quantitative nexus requirement is
clearly in part the absolute cost burden imposed by tax law compliance
in more than one taxing jurisdiction. The House Special Subcommit-
tee's study of compliance costs as a function of the size of the multi-
state taxpayer, while not totally conclusive,67 has shown compliance
costs to be only loosely correlated with business size. 8 A given cost
of compliance may be too high relative to a certain percentage of in-
state activity for a small company whereas it would not be too high for
a large company with the same or lesser in-state percentage of activ-
ity."
9
The basic problem is pointed out in the study published by the
House Special Subcommittee:
When compliance cost is compared with tax liability a very dif-
ferent picture emerges. Under the multistate tax system, com-
pliance costs are a large enough proportion of total tax liability to
bring the efficiency of the system into serious question. A prime
factor in this inefficiency is fragmentation of liability among the
states, which results in a large number of returns on which less
liability is reported than the immediate cost of preparing and filing
returns. The presence of these returns, and others on which cost
is a high proportion of liability, helps explain the present low
standards of enforcement and compliance. Potential compliance
cost has created pressure against performance of all the tax ac-
counting and filing necessary to satisfy the requirements of law.
T
O
In addition to amount and percentages of gross receipts, in-state
expenditures would probably also be important evidentiary factors in
establishing presence, but not necessarily absence, of quantitative sub-
stantiality.
71
3. Sufficient Nexus for Taxation v. Sufficient
Nexus for Service of Process
The quantitative sufficiency aspect of state income tax jurisdic-
975 (1962). In National Bellas Hess the dissenters noted that $2,174,744 of appellant's
total net sales of $60,000,000 came from Illinois. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1967).
67. 1 H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1, at 358-59.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 382-84.
71. The North Carolina Supreme Court in E.T. & W.N.C. Transportation Co. v.
Currie, in detailing the substantiality of the taxpayer's in-state activity, noted that the
company "paid rentals on its terminals in North Carolina in the amount of S21,911"
during the tax years in question. 248 N.C. 560, 576, 104 S.E.2d 403, 414 (1958),
aff'd, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
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tional nexus has been confused to some extent by repeated analogies to
the constitutional minimum nexus required for acquiring in personam
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. The most startling obfusca-
tion in this area was performed by Chief Justice Traynor in the case of
West Publishing Co. v. McColgan.72
On the basis of West's substantial income-producing activities
in California, 73 the California Supreme Court could have found
California's jurisdiction to tax unobjectionable on due process grounds
without the reference to International Shoe Co. v. Washington.74 In-
stead, the California court, after reciting the book publisher's sub-
stantial California activities, went on to justify the lack of due process
objectionability by comparing the situation before it to that in Inter-
national Shoe: "the activities . . .which served as the constitutional
basis for the imposition of the tax there involved were less extensive
than the activities of [the West Publishing Company in California].
75
The tax involved in International Shoe was ear-marked for special
purposes (for Washington's unemployment compensation fund) and
was measured as a percentage of wages payable annually by each em-
ployer for his employees' services in the state .7 The United States
Supreme Court in International Shoe accepted the facts in the record
that during the years in question the company employed eleven to thir-
teen salesmen who resided in Washington, whose principal activities
were confined to that state, and who were compensated by commis-
sions based upon the amount of their sales. The commissions for each
year totaled more than $31,000.
77
The major portion of the Court's opinion in International Shoe
was not concerned with the State of Washington's claim of the state's
substantive or legislative jurisdiction to tax, but rather with the subject
of the corporation's amenability to suit and service of process in that
state. 78  To the matter of the state's jurisdiction to tax, the Court de-
voted one short paragraph summarily sustaining Washington's right
to impose the specific-purpose tax. 79  Thus Chief Justice Traynor's re-
liance on International Shoe as implying a much lower nexus than in West
Publishing Co. between taxing state and corporate activity within that
72. 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, aff'd, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
73. Id. at 711, 166 P.2d at 865.
74. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
75. 27 Cal. 2d at 714, 166 P.2d at 866.
76. 326 U.S. at 310, 312 (1945).
77. Id. at 313.
78. See id. at 316.
79. Id. at 321.
March 19711 JURISDICTIONAL CONTACTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
state was inapposite. There was in fact quite a substantial nexus in
International Shoe when the relationship between the tax and the
transaction for which the tax is exacted is examined. Close func-
tional relationship existed between the activity conducted and the tax
imposed in International Shoe. 0
A policy behind more substantial nexus requirements for tax juris-
dictional purposes in contrast to judicial jurisdictional purposes is sup-
ported by a benefits versus burdens analysis. In the courts' furthest
reach, in personam jurisdiction over defendants through the medium of
long-arm statutes has brought out-of-state defendants before the courts
of the forum state because the defendant's availment of the state in
connection with the defendant's business created a great risk of loss
or potential for serious injury or damage.81 Even slight availment
by an out-of-state defendant, such as that represented by shipment of
one faulty machine manufactured by the defendant,82 may cause sub-
stantial injury. As a consequence, an injured party should be able to
bring the manufacturer before a court of his own state. Where the
plaintiff alleges a physical injury, courts often require defendants to
travel far to answer the complaint.
8 3
Grave risks of injury or damage justify conferring a benefit on the
injured party and casting a burden on the alleged tortfeasor. But in
the area of tax jurisdiction, where the substantiality of the out-of-state
corporation's activities within the state is so minimal as to be in ques-
tion, no such risks exist. The loss of revenues of which the state may
complain would be insignificant since the revenue lost would bear a
fairly direct relationship to the quantitative substantiality of the out-
of-state corporation's activities in the state.8 4  True, this may not be
the case in the area of mail order sales or in that of federally protected
sales solicitation activities under Public Law 86-272, but here a
higher authority (qualitative nexus requirements or congressional
80. The tax was a contribution to the Washington State unemployment fund, ex-
acted for the privilege of employing persons in Washington and measured by a per-
centage of wages paid to such employees (in the actual case, by commissions paid to
the shoe company's Washington solicitors). Id. at 313-14.
81. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
82. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 905-06, 458 P.2d 57, 65,
80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121-22 (1969).
83. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLICr OF LAWS 113-25 (1971).
84. Thus the tax revenue loss to the state from its failure to obtain tax jurisdiction
over a company which has made ten sales of $50 items, or a few hundred sales of $5
items, in the would-be taxing state is hardly comparable to the loss incurred by the ex-
plosion of one of those items which destroys the eyesight of the user.
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fiat) has determined that the state is not entitled to those revenues."5
Where, however, that right to ask a return exists (because of sufficient
qualitative or "physical" presence or lack of congressional protective
intervention) there would seem to be little likelihood of great revenue
loss unless the out-of-state company has engaged in quantitatively sub-
stantial in-state income-producing activity.
The other side of the benefits versus burdens argument also sug-
gests that a higher quantity of activity should be required for tax
jurisdiction than is required for judicial jurisdiction. If the right
of the state to ask a return has not been forbidden under the com-
merce clause or under the physical activity or involvement aspect of
due process nexus requirements, the question is whether the state has
given anything for which, in all fairness, a return ought to be due from
the out-of-state company. This return will involve not only a stated
dollar amount in tax, but also may involve a greater unstated amount
in compliance cost.
An important consideration is that the opportunities, protection
and benefits afforded by the would-be taxing state must bear some rea-
sonable relationship not only to the tax sought to be imposed, but also
to the potential taxpayer's additional administrative and operational
costs, legal and accounting fees and the costs of facing the possibility
of audit and other administrative procedures or judicial confrontations
in the taxing state regarding a controverted tax liability."" All of
these costs are likely to be much greater for an out-of-state company
conscientiously complying with in-state tax law requirements than for
the in-state company otherwise similarly situtated. The congressional
study of this matter87 seems to bear out the truth of Justice Frank-
furter's suggestion that, in the case of small business doing a small
amount of business in states other than its home state, "the cost of
such a far-flung scheme for complying with the taxing requirements
of the different states may well exceed the burden of the taxes them-
selves."
8
Both sides of the benefits versus burdens argument would seem
to indicate that the development of quantitative nexus requirements
comparable to those which have been developed in the area of in per-
sonam judicial jurisdiction should be rejected for want of a good rea-
son to make such extension.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1964).
86. See note 68 & accompanying text supra.
87. 1 H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1, at 358-59.
88. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 474
(1959) (dissenting opinion).
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The lack of comparability between standards applicable to in per-
sonam jurisdiction of courts and those relevant for state tax jurisdiction
does not solve the problem of what quantum of in-state activity should
be required to satisfy tax jurisdictional nexus requirements; neverthe-
less, it would appear that no policy reason exists to make occasional,
incidental or isolated in-state income-producing activity in the would-
be taxing state the basis of net income tax jurisdiction even though such
policy reasons may exist in the area of judicial jurisdiction.89
4. California's Informal Quantitative Minimum
California tax statutes and regulations contain no formal quanti-
tative minimum restricting assertion of corporate income tax juris-
diction in the case of marginally present out-of-state companies. The
Franchise Tax Board staff has, however, indicated that it will not assert
net income tax jurisdiction where in-state activities fall below a certain
quantitatively minimal level.90
Board staff personnel speak of "isolated or occasional transac-
tions." 91  The nature of activities as "isolated or occasional" depends
not only on how often the potential taxpayer engages in the activity
which, but for the requirement of quantitative substantiality, would be
sufficient for a claim of tax jurisdiction, but also on (1) the total
amount of the prospective taxpayer's activities of this sort everywhere,
and (2) the income attributable to the transactions or activities or to the
latter together with functionally closely related transactions or activ-
ities.92
Thus, for example, the staff would probably not assert jurisdic-
tion in a case involving the sale of fifty pencil sharpeners per year in
California by an out-of-state manufacturer's traveling representative
where the manufacturer (with annual sales of ten thousand of such
pencil sharpeners in its home state and in a few other states) is en-
gaged in sending traveling salesmen throughout the country to develop
new markets, even though the sales are consummated by salesmen in
89. In fact, to this writer's knowledge, no recent major court decision, when
squarely confronted with the issue of sufficiency of in-state activity to give a state tax
jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporate enterprise, has drawn upon standards of suffi-
ciency of contacts with the forum state for in personam jurisdiction purposes to validate
state income tax reach. The language in existing opinions implying comparability of
standards between these two areas is misleading and ought to be avoided in future deci-
sions in this area.
90. Informal comments, supra note 49.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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California. On the other hand, the sale of one computer system by
a foreign, out-of-state based computer manufacturer which annually
sells fifty such computers throughout the world would lead the staff
to scrutinize the situation much more closely. California corporate
income tax jurisdiction would probably be asserted if the sale is con-
cluded in California by the acceptance of an order for the computer,
or on any other ground which the staff feels could be used to place the
transaction outside the ambit of Public Law 86-272 protection. 3
This informal policy is more than administrative convenience and
practical restraint in enforcement tactics where revenue consequences to
the state are marginal. The staff would seem to be in agreement with
the proposition that more than quantitatively minimal in-state presence
is required to satisfy constitutional nexus standards. 94 As will be noted
later, the formalizing of such a policy in California through appropriate
legislation would relieve the area of state taxation of multistate enter-
prise of one of the most nagging ambiguities which presently confronts
small businesses doing a small volume of business in each of several
states.
PART TWO
II. Public Law 86-272 and Its Effect on
California Tax Administration
About the most that can be said in describing this statute [Public
Law 86-272] is that it was hastily enacted, is not very clear,
and is considerably restricted in its scope. .... 95
Had Congress in 1959 truly thought that small companies doing
a small volume of business in several states would be overburdened as a
result of the Northwestern States decision, it should have responded by
setting quantitative minimum nexus standards. Instead Congress,
through the substantive provisions of Public Law 86-272, added
new problems of applying and complying with definitionally vague tax
exemptions and created further inequity between classes and sizes of
taxpayers.
96
Public Law 86-272 federal tax immunity standards have had a





95. State ex rel CIBA Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382
S.W.2d 645, 652 (Mo. 1964).
96. See Note, State Taxation, 75 HARv. L. REv. 955, 1009 (1962).
97. An unofficial California Franchise Tax Board summary statement opposing
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The extent to which California has adjusted its law to accomodate con-
gressional standards, and the manner in which California and its sis-
ter states, led by Oregon, have interpreted and applied the act, will
take up a substantial portion of the ensuing discussion."
Public Law 86-272 in essence provides that no State or political
subdivision thereof may impose, for any taxable year ending after
[September 14, 1959] . . . a tax on net income, or a tax mea-
sured by net income, on income derived within the State by a com-
pany (whether it be an individual proprietorship, partnership, or
corporation) from interstate commerce if the only business activi-
ties within the State by or on behalf of such company [are] the so-
licitation of orders within the State for tangible personal property.
. . . To qualify, however, all such orders must be sent outside the
State for approval or rejection, and if approved, must be filled by
shipment or delivery from a point outside the State.
In addition, [the act] provides that no State or political
subdivision therof may impose such a tax merely because a com-
pany uses one or more "independent contractors" (a term defined
in the bill) making sales in such State, or soliciting orders in such
State for tangible personal property on its behalf. 99
The chief practical problems that have been encountered in rec-
onciling the federal law with state jurisdictional claims concern the
definition of business activities which, but for the federal exemption,
would subject the foreign corporation to state taxation.10 The major
further federal legislation of the type represented by H.R. 7906, supra note 23, indicates
that Public Law 86-272 requires California to exempt "a number of companies whose
gross sales in California exceed Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000) annually" and over
which California would presumably have had corporate net income tax jurisdiction in
the absence of the act. See Franchise Tax Board, H.R. 4178, H.R. 7906, and S.611 The
Interstate Income Acts, a History and Summary of the Income Tax Provisions of the
Bills, Apr. 2, 1969 (mimeographed pamphlet).
98. Public Law 86-272, the Interstate Income Act, has been expressly held by
the highest courts of three states to be a valid exercise of a long unexercised congressional
power. International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 902 (1964); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 420
P.2d 894 (Okla. 1966); Cal-Roof Wholesale, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Ore. 435,
410 P.2d 233 (1966); State ex rel CIBA Pharmaceutical Prods. Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964). In Georgia the act has apparently been viewed
as unconstitutional, while the Alabama Supreme Court in one decision ignored the act
completely and chose to base its decision to exempt an interstate wholesaler from the
Alabama Franchise Tax on state constitutional grounds. Compare BEAMAN, supra note
4, at 6.9, with Alabama v. West Point Wholesale Grocery Co., 66 CCH STATE TAX
CAS. REP., ALA. 250-189 (1969). Whtile its wisdom has been and may repeatedly be
questioned, the question at this point of the discussion is not Public Law 86-272's con-
stitutionality or its worth as a sensible piece of federal legislation, but its construction
and application as a part of California's rules for corporate income tax jurisdiction.
99. S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2548.
100. Potential problem areas for both state tax administrators and business tax
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areas of uncertainty concerning the application of the Interstate In-
come Act involve (1) the basic scope of income-producing business
activity; (2) the definition of permissible solicitation and the method
by which sales, albeit generated within the meaning of protected "solic-
itation," may be consummated under the act; and (3) the notion of
who is an "independent contractor" under the act and what activities
he may engage in without causing his supplier to lose protection from
state taxation otherwise afforded by Public Law 86-272.
A. The Scope of the Act: Business Activities v.
Investment Activities
1. Public Law 86-272: Investment v. Business Activities
The Interstate Income Act's thrust is based on isolating those
business activities that Congress considered insufficient by themselves
to support the assertion of state tax jurisdiction over a foreign, out-of-
state based corporation. Specifically, the act prohibits the imposition
of a state net income tax on "the income derived within such State by
any person from interstate commerce if the only business activities
within such State . . ." are of certain enumerated classes.'' The
question is one of locating the exact boundary of these classes of
federally protected in-state business activity.
Varying interpretations of the statutory language are possible.
Congress could have intended to protect the entire income (not just
the income from interstate sales) derived from the potential taxing
state by a person engaged in interstate commerce s02 who limits his in-
advisors in interpreting Public Law 86-272 in light of existing state jurisdictional claims
were outlined by Walter H. Beaman during the early years of the act's existence. BA-
MAN, supra note 4, at 6.3-.25. Certain of the interpretational questions have in the past
decade been the subject of judicial decisions; others have not, and the tax advisor may
expect that state tax officials will resolve almost every doubtful situation in favor of the
existence of sufficient nexus to allow jurisdictional claims. 1 H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra
note 1, at 595.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
102. The congressional debates imply that the phrase "interstate commerce" was
used to describe activities involving the sale of goods across state lines rather than in the
comprehensive sense sometimes used by the Supreme Court to justify congressional leg-
islative power. Compare 105 CONG. REc. 16,354 (1959) (remarks of Senator Byrd)
with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1941). Thus the phrase interstate commerce as
used by the act may be interchangeable with the phrase interstate business or interstate
sales of goods. Senator Byrd, in commenting on the necessity of congressional inter-
vention following Northwestern States notes that it "may become a real necessity if the
states, through their net income taxes, place a severe burden upon net income derived
from engaging in interstate commerce. This [intervention] may become necessary to
protect the thousands of relatively small or moderate size corporations doing exclusively
interstate business spread over the several states." 105 CONG. REc. 16,354 (1959).
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terstate business activities within the potential taxing state to those al-
lowed by the federal statute. At least one commentator seems to be
of this persuasion. 103 The preferable interpretation of the act, how-
ever, would seem to be that it was intended to restrict a state's net in-
come tax jurisdiction only over that income of foreign taxpayers de-
rived within such state from interstate business activity. In other
words, it can be argued that the act protects a foreign, out-of-state
based corporation only with respect to its income from business ac-
tivities, provided in-state business activities are properly limited to the
statutorily allowable extent. Under this interpretation, for example, if
the potential taxpayer has income from the rental of California-located
investment realty unrelated to the corporation's business of selling tan-
gible property, then despite the fact that the corporation conducts its
sales activities in strict accord with the safe harbour provisions of Pub-
lic Law 86-272, California ought to be entitled to claim income tax
jurisdiction over the rental income under established principles of tax
law allowing states to tax income from property located within their
boundaries.
The answer to the converse question, whether the ownership or
rental of real or tangible personal property in California, which prop-
erty is not employed in the out-of-state seller's business, ought to de-
stroy such seller's immunity despite the fact all sales activity is con-
ducted in compliance with Public Law 86-272, should be answered
by the same reasoning process. Thus, the existence of investment in-
come derived from the state should not destroy the protection afforded
by Public Law 86-272 to income derived from properly conducted
(within the immunity categories of the federal act) interstate sales ac-
tivity in that state.
It may be safely assumed that the concern of Northwestern States
and the congressional response thereto was with income from business
activity and not with investment income. 0 4  Thus, the act should not
be circumvented by allowing a state to use the income from in-state
investment property of a foreign, out-of-state based corporation, as the
jurisdictional hook upon which to hang a broad mantle of taxation. One
state has attempted, and it is not improbable that other states will follow,
103. See BEAMAN, supra note 15, at 6.13.
104. Congress intended its intervention to be limited to instances where the com-
mercial or "business presence," rather than presence through the out-of-state corpora-
tion's nonbusiness investments, raised jurisdictional questions. See 105 CONG. REC.
16,315 (1959); S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. &
Au. NEWS 2548.
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to circumvent the act by adopting a very broad interpretation of business
income.105
2. Californids Extension of Taxing Jurisdiction:
From Investment Income to Business Activities
California's law on whether or not a foreign, out-of-state based
corporation's ownership of realty or other investment property in Cali-
fornia, producing investment income only, would be sufficient nexus
for what might be called a "piggyback" assertion of jurisdiction to tax
is no longer clear. The California Franchise Tax Board staff's original
position in responding to the House Special Subcommittee's 1963
Nexus Questionnaire, as reported by the Special Subcommittee, was
that a foreign, out-of-state based corporation regularly shipping goods
by common carrier or mail into California, which obtained the sales
through telephone or mail orders without salesmen in this state would
not be subject to California corporate income tax on income from the
sale of goods simply because it owned "realty in the State producing
'investment income.' ,10 The same result would presumably have
followed where, in addition to owning in-state investment realty, the
corporation engaged in in-state business activities sanctioned under
Public Law 86-272.
The Franchise Tax Board staff position on this matter, however,
seems to have changed. In part this is undoubtedly due to California's
adoption, for accounting periods beginning on January 1, 1967, of
105. Cf. Sarver & Hynes, Proposal for a Uniform Regulation on Business Income
under UDITPA, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 31 (1970).
106. In order to ascertain the positions of the states concerning what type of cor-
porate activity would lead to a claim of net income tax jurisdiction, the House Special
Subcommittee staff, during February of 1963, sent a questionnaire to the tax administra-
tor of each state that had a corporate income tax. "In this questionnaire each adminis-
trator was asked the position taken by his State as to the application of the jurisdictional
rules to each of a number of hypothetical patterns of corporate activity. Thus, the ques-
tionnaire represented a series of practical questions of the kind which face a tax ad-
ministrator when he learns by inquiry from a taxpayer, or upon investigation by his staff,
that a corporation has certain activities in his State.
"In determining which activities were to be included in the questionnaire, it was
assumed that maintenance of a factory or a retail store in the State is universally consid-
ered sufficient to create liability. Therefore, no questions were asked about such ex-
tremely localized activities. Instead, proceeding from the baseline of assumed universal
liability, a series of questions were formulated to determine the effect of such other ac-
tivities as the maintenance within the State of a sales office, ownership of goods in stor-
age, and employee activities of various kinds." 1 H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1, at
147. A chart which presents the nexus standards for the various states is included. Id.
at 148-49. The possible impact on California revenue is discussed. Id. at 433.
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the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA).10 7
Prior to the adoption of UDITPA, California, in apportioning net in-
come of multistate corporations to sources within and without this state
through the use of its three-factor formula, assigned sales of tangible
personal property (and, thus, in a rough measure, net income from
such sales) "to the state where the employee sales activity in connec-
tion with the sales occurred."'0l8 But under UDITPA, sales are now
generally assigned to California if "the property is delivered or
shipped to a purchaser" in this state. 10 9 Under the former "locus of
employee sales activity" test there was little reason from a revenue
standpoint to attempt to assert jurisdiction over such sales on the basis
of in-state investment real estate ownership since such sales (and the
net income associated therewith) would, in any case, be assigned an
out-of-state locus for apportionment purposes in those cases where
employee salesmen and hence employee sales activity were not present
in this state. Under the UDITPA "sales destination" test, on the other
hand, mail or telephone order sales to customers in California repre-
sent a substantial revenue potential despite the absence of in-state
salesmen-provided California can obtain tax jurisdiction over such
mail or telephone order seller.
Franchise Tax Board personnel have indicated"0 that California
corporate income tax jurisdiction over foreign corporations obtained
on the basis of the foreign corporation's receipt of income from Cali-
fornia investment property will be asserted to require the foreign, out-
of-state based taxpayer to allocate and apportion its business income
among this state and other jurisdictions. Consequently, California will
tax a portion of the foreign taxpayer's business income which would not
have been taxable had the taxpayer not subjected its investment activ-
ities to California's jurisdictional reach. The validity of this posi-
tion is questionable in light of the Board of Equalization decision in
107. Cal. Stat. 1966, ch. 2, § 7, at 117-90 (codified at CAL REv. & TAX CODE
§§ 25120-139).
108. Franchise Tax Board comments regarding application of UDITPA, 4 CCH
STATE TAX REP., CAL. 1 203-548 (1967).
109. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 25135(a). Exceptions to this destination test of al-
locating sales occur in the case of sales other than sales of tangible personal property.
Thus, gross receipts from sales of intangible personal property incidental to the tax-
payer's main business are allocated under section 25136. But if these gross receipts rep-
resent the principal business of the taxpayer (e.g., management, advisory or advertising
services), they "will be assigned to the state where the income producing activity oc-
curs" under the authority given to the Franchise Tax Board by § 25137. Franchise
Tax Board comments, supra note 108.
110. Informal comments, supra note 49.
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Appeal of Joyce, Inc."'
The taxpayer (Joyce) was a California corporation engaged in a
unitary business with its parent United States Shoe Corporation (U.S.
Shoe), an Ohio corporation, and with various other U.S. Shoe subsid-
iaries.112  For present purposes, the characterization of Joyce and
U.S. Shoe as engaged in a unitary business may be considered the
equivalent of treating the companies as one corporation.
Aside from the fact that Joyce was incorporated in California
and owned certain leasehold improvements in this state, both Joyce
and U.S. Shoe conducted substantially identical operations in California
through sales representatives authorized to solicit, but not to accept
orders for their employers' shoes. All orders were forwarded to Cin-
cinnati for approval and were filled by shipment from outside Califor-
nia. The Board of Equalization held that Joyce was not protected
by Public Law 86-272 from California income tax on the basis of
its limited activities since it was a California corporation, but held
"the net income U.S. Shoe derived from sources within this state was
not includible" in the apportionment formula to determine Joyce's
California source income."
In effect the Board of Equalization determined that California
had no power to tax that portion of a foreign taxpayer's income de-
rived from business activities conducted within the immunizing provi-
sions of Public Law 86-272. Similarly, it could be argued that when
California obtains jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis
of its receipt of income from investments in California, unconnected
with its properly immunized sale of goods business in California, this
does not give California the power to tax income derived from inter-
state commerce if the only business activities within California were
conducted in full compliance with Public Law 86-272.
Assume that Joyce involved one corporation called U.S. Shoe
which conducted the same shoe sales solicitation operations in Cali-
fornia which it conducted in the actual case. Further assume that the
basis for jurisdiction over the Cincinnati-based corporation is not its
incorporation in California, but its ownership of substantial investment
property in California. Then U.S. Shoe's income from interstate
shoe sales, solicited in compliance with Public Law 86-272 and as-
111. 4 CCH STATE TAX REP., CAL. 203-523 (State Bd. Equal. 1966).
112. Id.
113. Appeal of Joyce, Inc., 4 CCH STATE TAX REP. CAL. 1 203-523, at 13,118
(State Bd. Equal. 1966), citing 15 U.S.C. § 381(b)(1) (1964).
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sumed to be unrelated to its ownership of investment property in Cali-
fornia, should not become subject to California tax liability to any
greater degree in the hypothetical case than in the actual case. Cer-
tainly the result would be the same as in the actual case if U.S. Shoe
were to hold its California investment property by means of a wholly-
owned California incorporated subsidiary." 4  Since the distinction
between a wholly-owned subsidiary and a corporate division is frequently
ignored in other situations where unitariness is in question," 5 the re-
sult urged immediately above should be no different where investment
property is owned by the foreign corporation rather than through a sub-
sidiary.
Even if nonbusiness or investment income will not be allowed as
a basis for a piggy-back assertion of jurisdiction to require allocation to
this state of business income, it may be expected that the Franchise
Tax Board staff, in efforts to minimize revenue losses resulting from
UDITPA's apportionment rules, will try to show that property, with
locus or situs in California, which has traditionally been classified as
investment property, is really a part of a potential taxpayer's business
activity. Since it is a business activity in excess of those business activ-
ities allowed by Public Law 86-272, it is cause for withdrawal of the
federal law's protection from actual business activity otherwise qualify-
ing." 6 As a counter to such an approach by the California admin-
istrators, a taxpayer must argue for a narrow interpretation of busi-
ness income and for treating business income separately from invest-
ment income in determining a state's power to tax as suggested in
the previous section.
B. Business Activities within the Scope of
Permitted Solicitation
The greatest need for interpretation and clarification of Public
Law 86-272 lies in the activities which will be considered to lie
within the intended meaning of "solicitation of orders within the state
for the sale of tangible personal property" which orders are accepted
out-of-state and filled through the limited in-shipment or delivery al-
lowed by the act." 7  Initially, however, it seems important to discuss
114. One member of the California Franchise Tax Board's legal staff has indicated
that the board might follow Joyce in the hypothesized situation if the investment business
were separately incorporated. Informal comments, supra note 49.
115. See Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947).
116. Cf. Sarver & Hynes, Proposal for a Uniform Regulation on Business Income
Under UDITPA, 22 HASiNOs L.J. 31 (1970).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1964).
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the circumstances under which the taxpayer's ownership or use of
property within the taxing state, being activity other than the permissi-
ble activity of solicitation, constitutes business activity outside the pro-
tection of Public Law 86-272.
1. Ownership or Use of Business Property in California
Ownership or use in this state of property, real or personal,
not held purely for investment will destroy Public Law 86-272 pro-
tection.118 This holds true whether the property is rented office
space, equipment used in the manufacture, distribution, or sale of
goods, or whether the property consists of an inventory or supply
of the out-of-state seller's goods." 9  The Franchise Tax Board staff
has indicated that the only exceptions to the in-state property own-
ership or use basis for assertion of tax jurisdiction are the occasional
rentals for short periods of display space, the carrying by salesmen of
samples which are not for sale as part of the solicitation effort, the
use by salesmen of their residences for record-keeping purposes, the
in-state garaging of company-owned cars used by salesmen in their
solicitation efforts or the existence of the company's telephone listing
in the state.120
Regular and systematic use of company-owned or rented vehicles
118. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., in [1959] U.S. CODE CONo.
& AD. NEWS 2554. See note 106 supra.
119. Franchise Tax Bd. Reg. 23040(b) provides in part: "Foreign corporations do
not become subject to the franchise taxes simply because they send goods of California
dealers or brokers on consignment or because they maintain stocks of goods here from
which deliveries are made pursuant to orders taken by independent dealers or brokers.
Such corporations, however, are subject to the income tax, since a portion of their in-
come is attributable to the investment represented by the property located in this State.
"Foreign corporations which make deliveries from stocks of goods located in this
State pursuant to orders taken by employees in this State are engaged in intrastate busi-
ness in this State and are subject to the bank and corporation franchise tax, even though
they have no office or regular place of business in this State. . . . Corporations de-
scribed in this paragraph are doing business in this State. They are not within the pur-
view of Section 101(a) of Public Law 86-272...." (emphasis added).
In its informal Guide to Corporations sent in October 1970 to foreign corporations
which "may be subject to the provisions of the California Bank and Corporation Tax
Law because the corporation owns or rents real or tangible personal property in this State
or its employees perform services in this State," the Franchise Tax Board enumerated
the following property ownership or use activities among those not protected by Public
Law 86-272 immunity: "Maintenance of a sales office, warehouse, inventory, repair
shop, parts department, purchasing office, employment office, meeting place for direc-
tors, ownership of TV films or supervising the making of such films, ownership or rental
of real or tangible personal property."
120. 1 H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1, at 148-49.
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to make in-state deliveries of products sold through otherwise quali-
fying solicitation would probably, in the view of certain Franchise Tax
Board staff personnel, destroy federal immunity. The argument in sup-
port of this position is either that the out-of-state seller had business prop-
erty located in California, or that it was engaged in rendering a service
(delivery of goods) outside the scope of protected activity.' 21  This
writer's contention that jurisdiction asserted on the basis of such in-
state deliveries represents a questionable interpretation of the scope of
immunity provided by the federal law is discussed at a later point in
this article.
The congressional proponents of Public Law 86-272 clearly in-
tended that federal immunity ought not to extend to warehousing or
maintenance of regular stocks of goods by an out-of-state seller,
whether at its own in-state facilities or with independent contractors
or public warehouses. 2 By its deliberate use of the phrase "making
sales," however, Congress must have contemplated that independent
contractors would not be limited solely to the acceptance of offers of
purchase or orders for goods to be filled by direct shipment or de-
livery to the customer from out-of-state. It might be argued, especially
in light of the commonly accepted commercial law definition of "sale"
as the passage of title to goods from seller to buyer,2 3 that an inde-
pendent contractor ought to be able to receive goods on consignment
from the out-of-state seller pursuant to orders already accepted by the
independent contractor for delivery to, or pick up by, specific cus-
tomers.' 24  This method of operation would allow an independent
121. Informal comments, supra note 49.
122. See, e.g., 105 CoNG. REc. 16,354 (1959) (remarks of Senator Byrd).
123. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2106(1); see Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of
Educ., 51 Cal. 2d 640, 335 P.2d 672 (1959); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6006.
124. Sales by commission agents or brokers are normally made on consignment.
The principal delivers goods to the agent or broker, who has the power, right and duty to
sell the same for his principal according to the contract of consignment. See, e.g.,
Moulton v. William Fruit Corp., 218 Cal. 106, 21 P.2d 936 (1933). "The essence of
agency to sell is the delivery of goods to a person who is to sell them, not as his own
property but as the property of the principal, who remains the owner of the goods and
who therefore has the right to control the sale, to fix the price and terms, to recall the
goods, and to demand and receive their proceeds when sold, less the agent's commission,
but who has no right to a price for them before sale or unless sold by the agent." United
States v. City & County of San Francisco, 23 F. Supp. 40, 48 (N.D. Cal. 1938), rev'd,
106 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1939), rev'd, 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
It seems highly unlikely that Congress, by the language limiting permissible activity
of the independent contractor to "making sales, or soliciting orders for sales, of tangible
personal property," without further express limitation, intended anything other than the
ordinary and usual meaning of the term "sales." Consignment of goods for sale, if not
a necessary prerequisite to sale (goods can be sold directly to the ultimate purchaser,
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
contractor to transact cash and carry sales-i.e., receive the purchase
price from the customer in exchange for the goods consigned for the
buyer's benefit-and still avoid such maintenance of regular inventories
or stocks of goods in the state as would clearly destroy federal protec-
tion.
Regulation 23040(b), paragraph three,1 2 5 nevertheless indi-
cates that consignment of goods to independent contractors for filling
orders which are otherwise qualifying sales would exceed the activity
permitted to independent contractors making sales in the state or
maintaining a sales office in California. For reasons mentioned in the
above paragraph, this may be too restrictive a reading of sales activities
permitted tQ a company's independent contractor. Certainly the entire
area of cash or over-the-counter sales would be foreclosed to the inde-
pendent contractor, and section 101(c) of Public Law 86-272
would have to be construed as allowing independent contractors to
engage only in activities consisting solely of "making of contracts of
sale" rather than in activities consisting solely of "making sales."'12 6
It should be noted that the portion of the regulation 23040(b)
which purports to claim tax jurisdiction on the basis of consigned goods
has not been amended since 1952.1 It represents a possible inter-
pretation of the then existing constitutional standard. It makes no
reference to and presumably does not take a definite position with re-
spect to the exemption provided by the federal act. This paragraph of
the regulation, it is submitted, must be interpreted as permitting specific
consignment of goods to independent contractors for the benefit of
specific buyers, thus allowing independent contractors to complete
sales by delivery of merchandise.
Such an interpretation would not open the door to large-scale tax
avoidance. The regulation may be validly interpreted to prohibit the
general consignment of merchandise to independent contractors in any
substantial amount. Either the "stock of goods" in this state could be
attributed to the out-of-state seller, or the independent contractor could
with the commission agent making the sale, by having the agent transfer a bill of
lading, warehouse receipt or other document of title to the purchaser), would certainly
be an ordinary and usual part of an agency to sell.
125. For wording of the regulation, see note 119 supra.
126. Nothing in the legislative history of Public Law 86-272 indicates that sales
by independent contractors are to be limited only to the closing of contracts of sale or
to the acceptance of orders for the sale of goods. See also BEAMAN, supra note 4 at
6.23.
127. See note 6 supra.
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be considered to be engaged in warehousing.128 The regulation
could furthermore be validly interpreted as prohibiting consignment of
goods with the independent contractor for the benefit of specific cus-
tomers who were solicited not by the independent contractor, but by
the out-of-state seller's in-state solicitors.
2. The Scope of Permitted Solicitation and Filling of Orders
for the Sale of Tangible Personal Property
Determining the proper scope of protection accorded to certain
business activities by Public Law 86-272, where no in-state business
property ownership or use is involved, will be analyzed by distin-
guishing permissible activity from prohibited activity in four distinct
areas: (a) promotional activity designed to increase general goodwill
and demand for the company's products; (b) rendering of technical
services related to the product sold, whether prior to the actual placing
of an order or subsequent to the actual sale; (c) taking steps to assure
collection of the sales price, whether by way of presolicitation or pre-
sale credit investigation or approval, by way of retention and enforce-
ment of a security interest for the collection of the sales price or by way
of repossession of the product sold; and (d) corporate executive, admin-
istrative, managerial or other presence not directly and necessarily re-
lated to the permitted solicitation of orders.
Some activity in each of the above categories may, to a greater
or lesser extent, be a direct and necessary part of the permitted solicita-
tion and sale process-depending, in each particular case, on the na-
ture of the product and practice in the seller's industry. It is neverthe-
less important in tax planning to alert one's clients to possible distinc-
tions between permissible and impermissible activities in the bor-
derland between allowable solicitation and other activities.
a) PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITY
Promotional activity other than that which takes place between the
soliciting representative and the prospective customer is perhaps the
area where the greatest latitude is given to the interstate seller or to his
local representative. As noted above, 129 advertising, even through
purely local facilities, will not by itself destroy federal immunity for
the interstate seller in California. Purchase of advertising space, time
128. CAL. COMM. CODE § 7102(h) defines a warehouseman, for document of title
purposes, as "a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire."
129. See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
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or expertise in local publications, on local broadcast media or from lo-
cal advertising agencies may require no corporate presence via em-
ployees or property in this state and as such may not even meet the
level of nexus required under current constitutional standards.130
A closer question is presented where the out-of-state seller has
its own employees in California engaged in promotional activities
apart from the actual solicitation of orders. Here the question is
whether (a) the solicitation of customer's customers, or (b) general
product promotion by employees other than sales employees may be
considered beyond the bounds of permissible solicitation.
(1) Soliciting Customers' Customers
Despite the fact that solicitation of orders "for the benefit of a
prospective customer" is expressly permitted by section 101 (a) (2)
of the federal act, the question whether this provision gave the out-of-
state seller the license to promote the use of his product through in-
state canvassers (variously called missionary men or detail men) was
raised soon after the passage of Public Law 86-272. Oregon's tax
administrator in Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax
Commission131 urged that such activity was outside the protected
scope of solicitation. The court's framing of the issue and holding
with respect to the activities of Smith, Kline's detail men in Oregon is
instructive:
Defendant contends that P.L. 86-272 creates an "island of im-
munity" around the solicitation activities expressly described in the
statute; that solicitation of orders requires that an actual order be
sought by an individual calling upon a potential customer; and
that the activities of plaintiff's employees, which merely encouraged
the placing of orders with the wholesale drug firms selling plain-
tiff's products, do not qualify plaintiff for exemption.
[P]laintiff contends that its Oregon employees do solicit or-
ders for plaintiff's customers within the meaning of P.L. 86-272
and that the statute does not require the receipt of an order by
plaintiff's employees so long as they are soliciting and encourag-
ing the purchase of plaintiff's products.
In this court's opinion, plaintiff's activities in Oregon meet the
statutory requirements for exemption. Congressional commit-
tee reports support this conclusion. . . . These reports show that
Congress intended to exempt not only the specifically described
phase of interstate sales efforts but also all lesser, included phases.
130. Cf. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 420 P.2d 894
(Okla. 1966), where the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Public Law 86-272 pre-
vented imposition of the state income tax where the out-of-state seller arranged for news-
paper, trade publication and billboard advertising through local independent agencies.
131. 241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965).
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Furthermore, the nature of plaintiff's business makes its ac-
tivities in Oregon the equivalent of solicitation of orders in other,
less technical businesses. Ethical drugs are generally purchased
by the public from retail druggists. The drug to be purchased is
selected, not by the purchaser, but by his physician. An ethical
drug sales effort comparable to direct solicitation of orders for
shoes, valves, or cement requires "selling" the physician on the wis-
dom of prescribing the particular product for his patient. By so-
liciting the stocking of plaintiff's products by druggists and the
prescription of those drugs by physicians, plaintiff's detail men per-
form the same sales function in plaintiff's field that salesmen so-
liciting actual orders from the ultimate user perform in other bus-
inesses. A realistic legal and factual interpretation of P.L. 86-
272 requires exemption of plaintiff from Oregon corporation in-
come tax.
1 32
Despite the seemingly clear applicability of section 101 (a) (2)
of the Interstate Income Act to the Smith, Kline fact situation, Califor-
nia's 1963 position on this matter would have been in line with that of
the Oregon Tax Commission 33 and contrary to the opinion expressed
by the Oregon Supreme Court. Franchise Tax Board personnel have
informally indicated, however, that the result and reasoning of Smith,
Kline would be followed in California today.1
34
In Smith, Kline the Oregon Court also found that the maintenance
of stocks of samples of the seller's products by the detail men at
their homes for use in their promotional work was within permitted
solicitation.1 5  In State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.
v. State Tax Commission,3 6 decided by the Missouri Supreme Court
some 9 months before Smith, Kline and also involving detailing activi-
ties of representatives of a major pharmaceutical house, a similar re-
sult was reached. The Missouri court noted that:
132. Id. at 51-56, 403 P.2d 377-78 (quoting the Oregon Tax Court). The Oregon
court in Smith, Kline specifically held that the term "solicitation" was intended to de-
scribe not only the solicitation by the foreign seller's representatives of orders to be
placed directly with the foreign seller but also all lesser, included phases. The notion of
"lesser, included phrases" must be read narrowly in light of the Oregon Supreme Court's
later statements. See Cal-Roof Wholesale, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Ore. 435, 410
P.2d 233 (1966), where an out-of-state seller "customarily entered into a cooperative ad-
vertising agreement in Washington with its Washington customer." Id. at 437, 410 P.2d
at 234. Such cooperative advertisement agreements, in addition to other activities poten-
tially outside the concept of "solicitation," resulted in the decision in that case that the
ou:-of-state seller's "Washington activities clearly encompassed more than 'solicitation'
only." Id. at 448, 410 P.2d at 239.
133. 1 Ore. Tax Rep. advance sheet 491 (1964).
134. Informal comments, supra note 49.
135. Smith, Kline & French Labs v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d
375 (1965).
136. 382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964).
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The representatives explain the therapeutic value of CIBA's prod-
ucts to the doctors. They tell what the product is, what it will
do, what dosage is desirable and what its side effects may be.13"
The Tax Commission strenuously objected to the detail men's traveling
through Missouri
not only with promotional and advertising materials which they give
to [CIBA's] customers-the retail druggists. . . but also with bro-
chures, pamphlets, daily reminder calendars and drug samples
which they give to doctors.
13 8
Nevertheless, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
trial court, clearly implying that the carrying and distribution of ad-
vertising literature and samples for the use of the druggists and doctors
solicited did not exceed the minimum activities permitted by Public
Law 86-272.139
CIBA and Smith, Kline provide persuasive authority for such
practice under California law. In fact, Franchise Tax Board staff mem-
bers have informally indicated that its 1963 position has been modified
and that the practice of leaving literature and samples similar to those in
the above cases would not by itself be sufficient to sustain California
tax jurisdiction. 4 °
It should be noted that the products carried in the state must be
strictly limited to samples and cannot include items for occasional re-
sale and on-the-spot delivery. 14 1  California's position seems identi-
cal with Oregon's on this point.
141
(2) General Product Promotion
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, in the recent
decision of Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley 43 reached a result contrary to
CIBA and Smith, Kline in a closely similar situation involving the ac-
tivities of a cosmetic producer's detail men and technical representa-
tives in New Jersey. The activities of Clairol's detail men resembled
137. Id. at 648.
138. Id. at 651.
139. Id.
140. Informal comments, supra note 49.
141. See Cal-Roof Wholesale, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Ore. 435, 437, 410
P.2d 233, 234 (1966), where the Oregon court noted as one of the factors which led to
the decision that the taxpayer's in-state activities exceeded the permissible limits of so-
licitation was that the taxpayer's Washington salesman "customarily carried with him a
supply of small items which he sold and delivered within the state of Washington" (em-
phasis added).
142. Informal comments, supra note 49.
143. 109 N.J. Super. 22, 262 A.2d 213 (App. Div. 1970).
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those of CIBA's detail men in the Missouri case.' But the Clairol
case differs from CIBA and Smith, Kline in that Clairol also had a
second type of representative in New Jersey whose task was to call
not on cosmetic retailers, but on beauty salons for the purpose of ex-
plaining uses and effects of Clairol's products and new techniques rela-
tive to the use of such products. "These people have a technical back-
ground, whereas the people calling on drugstores do not have a tech-
nical background."' 5
To the extent the court meant to stress that detailing activities
alone provided jurisdictional nexus not prohibited by Public Law 86-272,
the court's position is highly questionable.""0 To the extent, how-
ever, that the New Jersey court meant to stress that the instructional
functions, activities and services of the technicians calling on beauty
salons went beyond "mere solicitation" permitted by Public Law 86-
272, a more substantial interpretational question was raised. This is-
sue was resolved in favor of a finding of "mere solicitation" where the
technical or instructional activities were performed by the promotional
representatives in CIBA and Smith, Kline. The existence of a second
force of representatives engaged solely in technical and instructional
activities made the New Jersey court's task of finding a business activity
which extends "beyond the mere solicitation of orders either on its own
behalf or on behalf of its wholesalers" much simpler.
By its conduct in separating the functions of promotional and
technical representatives, the taxpayer in Clairol has practically ad-
mitted that it was engaged in significant activity which was separate
and distinct from the solicitation performed in New Jersey. The Cali-
fornia Franchise Tax Board staff's position that the "conducting of train-
ing courses or lectures" by a foreign seller's in-state representatives would
cause loss of Public Law 86-272 immunity is aimed in part at
conduct similar to that of the "technicians" in Clairol.
14 7
144. Compare id. at 29-30, 262 A.2d at 217, with State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceuti-
cal Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Mo. 1964).
145. 109 N.J. Super. at 30, 262 A.2d at 217. The Clairol opinion is not entirely
clear whether the above-mentioned technicians were Clairol's employees or those of
"beauty jobbers" or "salon wholesalers" who purchase from Clairol and sell to beauty
salons so as to qualify potentially as independent contractors. See text accompanying
note 243 infra. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the decision is based on
Clairol's other activities such as ownership of property and maintenance of business of-
fices in New Jersey. See id. at 25, 262 A.2d at 215. The existence of such facts seems to
render the comments on the detailing and technical activities of its representatives un-
necessary to obtain the tax jurisdictional result reached.
146. See text accompanying notes 128-29 supra.
147. In its informal Guide to Corporations, supra note 119, the Franchise Tax
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Clairol's implication with respect to promotional activity aimed
at increasing general goodwill for its products and retaining its cus-
tomers, over and above such promotion as is necessary to secure im-
mediate orders, spells a setback for out-of-state sellers. The New
Jersey court made a special point of quoting the testimony of the tax-
payer's representative that the promotional material carried by its de-
tail men was "used mostly for public relations, more or less.' 148  The
court noted
that increased public favor of Clairols products will eventually re-
sult in increased orders from retail druggists to wholesalers and
from wholesalers to Clairol, or as in the case of its hair products
from beauty salons to "beauty jobbers" and from the latter to
Clairol, does not blanket all Clairol's activities with the protection
afforded by the federal act to cases where the only business activity
of the taxpayer is the solicitation of orders. 149
Thus Clairol, with its express disapproval of the broad language of
Smith, Kline, may portend a strict construction of the term "solicitation."
In other words, perhaps promotional activity will be required to be
more proximately connected with the placing of orders for the out-of-
state seller's products rather than merely to increase public favor for
the seller's product.
In Atlas Foundry & Machine Co. v. State Tax Commission5 °
the Oregon Tax Court, following that state's supreme court's decision
in Smith Kline,' 5' considered the activities of a foreign seller's Ore-
gon employee who "spent two-thirds of his time in Oregon promoting
goodwill and sales."' 52  The court noted that the representative's
work
consisted of maintaining contact with plaintiff's customers to encour-
age them to request bids from his firm. . . .If a customer had a
Board listed as activities in California which "may result in the loss of immunity under
Public Law 86-272, depending on the facts in each case," the following activities:
"Pickup of damaged or returned merchandise, execution of contracts, approval of credit,
collection of accounts, supervision of personnel, installation of products, supervision of
installation of products, inspection of products installed, handling of complaints, approval
of orders, conducting training courses or lectures, investigation or appointment of agents
or distributors, repossession of company's products, securing of deposits on sales, pro-
viding of engineering functions, etc."
Discussion with Franchise Tax Board personnel, supra note 49, indicates that the
phrase "conducting of training courses or lectures" will be construed to include activities
such as those of Clairol's technical representatives.
148. 109 N.J. Super. at 29, 262 A.2d at 217.
149. Id. at 30, 262 A.2d at 218.
150. 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., ORF. 201-604 (Ore. Tax Ct., No. 128, 1965).
151. Id. at 12,131-32.
152. Id. at 12,130.
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complaint he ordinarily would contact plaintiff's office in Tacoma,
but if the salesman was present they would advise him and he
would send this information to Tacoma. He carried no samples
because of the nature of the plaintiff's specialized manufacturing
business which depended on particular orders from the buyers.
153
The tax court, noting that the Smith, Kline decision held that
"Congress intended to exempt not only the specifically described
phase of interstate sales efforts [e.g. direct solicitation of orders] but
also all lesser, included phases,"' 54 held that the above-quoted general
promotional activities were such lesser included phases of solicitation
and hence exempt under Public Law 86-272 as interpreted by
Smith, Kline.'55 A later decision by the very same court which de-
cided Atlas Foundry sheds doubt on the current validity of the opinion
expressed therein.' 6
In view of the Clairol decision, the Franchise Tax Board staffs lib-
erality on permissible advertising placed with or conducted through local
media or agencies ought not to lead an out-of-state seller to believe
that pervasive advertising or promotional activity can be conducted by
that seller through its own employees without loss of federal immunity.
Where promotional activity engaged in by employees is so extensive
that it can be characterized as something more than soliciting orders
from customers, or customer's customers, and especially if this pro-
motional activity is not the usual and established practice for securing
such orders in the industry, it is likely to be considered as exceeding
the permissible scope of solicitation under Public Law 86-272.'"1
b) RENDERING TECHNICAL SERVICES
The rendering of personal services by the out-of-state seller's in-
state employees, even when done in connection with an otherwise
153. Id.
154. Id. at 12,131.
155. Id. at 12,132.
156. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 2 CCII STATE TAX REP., Ore.
201-929 (Ore. Tax Ct., No. 295, 1968). The court there noted that the "deci-
sion of the Tax Court in Atlas, relied upon by plaintiff, must be considered in light of"
the limitation placed on Smith, Kline through the Oregon Supreme Court decision in
Herff Jones Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 Ore. 404, 430 P.2d 998 (1967).
157. Informal comments, supra note 49. See also, United States Tobacco Co. v.
Mack, 229 Ore. 627, 368 P.2d 337 (1962), where the promotional activities of an out-of-
state seller included advertising of the products, educating retailers to perpetuate their
sales of such products, and assisting the latter in advertising and merchandising dis-
plays. The Oregon Supreme Court found that this general promotional activity was suf-
ficient under Northwestern States to remove the resulting sales from the protection of
Public Law 86-272.
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qualified and exempted solicitation and sales effort, has been ex-
pressly declared a basis for California corporate income tax jurisdiction
because of activity outside that protected by Public Law 86-272.158
Such sales-related service activity may occur at various times and
in various forms during the solicitation-through-sales process. Initially,
it may take the form of consultation with respect to specifications and
advice on the prospective buyer's technical requirements for products
for which orders are solicited. 5 9 Such activity is particularly likely
to be present where the product is technically complex or must be
custom-made to the prospective buyer's requirements. 160
Service may continue after the order has been placed and ac-
cepted and while the product is being made or delivered. 6' The seller
may perform a service by furnishing guidance during in-state installa-
tion or construction, even if such installation or construction is per-
formed by the buyer or by an independent contractor. 62  Services
may involve the inspection and approval of installation prior to opera-
tion or merely the availability of advice during start-up operations. 63
The Oregon Tax Court decision in Briggs & Stratton Corp. V.
State Tax Commission6 provides the clearest judicial expression to
date on the disqualifying effect of the in-state rendering of technical
services as part of an interstate sale-of-goods effort by foreign
sellers.165 In Briggs & Stratton a foreign manufacturer and seller of
158. Franchise Tax Bd. Reg. 23040(b), provides, in part: "Foreign corporations
which have employees in this State engaged in providing personal services other than in
interstate commerce are engaged in intrastate business in this State and are subject to
bank and corporation franchise tax, even though they have no office or regular place of
business in this State. Corporations described in this paragraph are doing busi-
ness in this State. They are not within the purview of section 101(a) of Public Law 86-
272, supra." The Franchise Tax Board's informal Guide to Corporations, supra note
119, gives an indication of the type of personal services which would place the out-of-
state seller's activity outside the protection of Public Law 86-272.
159. See Iron Fireman Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 251 Ore. 227, 445 P.2d 126
(1968); Riblet Tramway Co., 4 CCH STATE TAX CAs. REP., CAL. 1 203-786 (State Bd.
Equal., Dec. 12, 1967).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Combustion Eng'r, Inc. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 91 Ariz. 253, 371 P.2d
879 (1962); cases cited note 159 supra.
163. Riblet Tramway Co., 4 CCH STATE TAX CAS. REP., CAL. 203-786 (State
Bd. Equal. Dec. 12, 1967).
164. CCH STATE TAX REP., ORE. 201-929 (Ore. Tax Ct., No. 295, 1968).
165. "Plaintiff's direct representation in Oregon is by a salaried sales and service
supervisor who lives in Washington and spends approximately one week of every eight
in Oregon. He does not make collections or repossessions, approve credit, accept pay-
ments or make any deliveries of merchandise. The supervisor does no newspaper ad-
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gasoline engines maintained direct representation in Oregon (in addi-
tion to sales through independent contractors), through a "salaried sales
and service supervisor who lives in Washington and spends approxi-
mately one week of every eight in Oregon." 166  The court noted that
plaintiff's activities through its sales and service supervisor in Ore-
gon are clearly in excess of solicitation of orders .
[H]e gives technical engineering advice to customers, approves
the appointment of service distributors, conducts training schools
and lectures on the proper service techniques, and inspects the ade-
quacy of the inventory, the tools and the shop [of the seller's prin-
cipal independent Oregon distributor].' 1 7
Franchise Tax Board staff personnel have noted that this Oregon de-
cision will be followed in California as a matter of administrative prac-
tice. 168
The California State Board of Equalization decision in Riblet
Tramway Co.'69 sheds light on another aspect of impermissible technical
activity, one which may be more for the benefit of the seller than it is a
service to the buyer. In Riblet Tramway the appellant taxpayer, a Wash-
ington State designer, manufacturer and seller of tramways and ski
lifts, was engaged in substantial activities in California in connection
with the sale of its product to a California customer. In the opinion
of the Board of Equalization, Riblet Tramway Company's activities
were not sufficiently restricted to permissible solicitation. The board
vertising in Oregon but does provide up-to-date sales and service manuals.
"One of the supervisor's main functions is to contact the nine original equipment
manufacturers who are plaintiff's customers, give them engineering advice and encour-
age them to buy Briggs & Stratton engines. He also attempts to rectify any complaints
concerning the use of plaintiff's engines.
"One of the primary duties of the supervisor is to maintain a close liaison with
Tracey 'to see what problems they may have' and that their inventory is adequate. He
also makes inspections to see that Tracey's tools and shop are adequate to make the nec-
essary repairs, instructs them on the proper service techniques, and sees that the war-
ranty policies and complaints are properly handled. He, with Tracey, conducts three or
four service schools in Oregon each year for Tracey personnel and for the service dis-
tributors and dealers and sees that they are attended by the proper persons. The super-
visor is one of the lecturers at the school and shows the various mechanics how to re-
pair and service plaintiffs products. In addition, two members of the plaintiff's organi-
zation came out from Milwaukee to assist in conducting the service schools in Oregon.
"The supervisor is also responsible for seeing that Tracey's service data is kept
up-to-date. He follows up on customer complaints and makes regular reports to plain-
tiff regarding conditions in Oregon and at Tracey. He also gives approval to the ap-
pointment by Tracey of service distributors and service dealers." Id. at 12,497-98.
166. Id. at 12,497.
167. Id. at 12,498.
168. Informal comments, supra note 49.
169. 4 CCH STATE TAX CAS. REP., CAL. % 203-786 (State Bd. Equal. 1967).
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described the appellant's activity as follows:
In the typical situation appellant received a written solicitation from
a prospective customer. In response appellant requested such en-
gineering information as soil samples of the lift site, profile of the
site, size, and other specifications of the lift. The information was
furnished by the customer's engineers or independent contractors
with whom the customer had contracted. After analyzing the in-
formation appellant advised the prospective customer of the parts
and materials required and the cost. If the customer then wished
to buy, an order was placed with the Washington office.
170
In rendering its decision the board failed to refer to the above
presale activity of the appellant. Rather, its decision rested on a
finding that the appellant's post-sale inspection activity exceeded that
allowed under the Public Law 86-272 solicitation concept.
171
The Franchise Tax Board staff attitude on such solicitation of spec-
ifications is not clear.' 7 -  The recently issued Guide to Corporations
indicates that the furnishing of engineering functions may result in the
loss of immunity under Public Law 86-272Y.17 Conversations with
board personnel indicate that in-state consultation on design and
specifications will probably be considered the rendering of personal
services if such activity involves any significant technical services.' 74
Consequently, it may be difficult for a foreign seller of highly complex
and custom-made machinery or equipment to stay within the Public
Law 86-272 protected solicitation effort if its sales personnel are
trained engineers who customarily consult with a prospective buyer
at the latter's California place of business. Certainly, if the corpora-
tion has salesmen engaged solely in soliciting orders and technical
personnel engaged only in consulting and advising with respect to
specifications and engineering data in the state, the reasoning of
Clairol75 would seem to doom Public Law 86-272 immunity.
Under the present state of the law and particularly under the first
paragraph of California Franchise Tax Regulation 23040(b),1 76 the
problem of specification solicitation and related technical discussion
may be solved to the out-of-state seller's advantage through telephonic
or electronic transmission of charts and graphs, or long-distance video-
170. Id. at 13,350.
171. See id. at 13,351. This may indicate that activities such as the solicitation of
specifications engaged in by the Washington seller in Riblet Tramway may be consid-
ered a part of or incidental to solicitation.
172. Informal comments, supra note 49.
173. See note 119 supra.
174. Informal comments, supra note 49.
175. Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley, 109 N.J. Super. 22, 262 A.2d 213 (App. Div. 1970).
176. CAL. An. CODE tit. 18, ch. 3, subch. 3.5, Reg. 23040(b).
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phone consultation. Whether or not the Franchise Tax Board will
take the position that such electronic visual and verbal consultation
involves the in-state rendering of personal services must be left for res-
olution at a later date.
The proper test for determining the scope of federally protected
solicitation should consider (1) whether the conduct was reasonably
necessary to persuade and induce potential customers or customers of
potential customers to place orders for the out-of-state seller's prod-
uct;177 (2) whether the conduct is engaged in by the soliciting rep-
resentative (not by a second category of pure "good will" promotional
or technical personnel); 7 8  and (3) whether the conduct precedes
the placing of an actual order for the product. 7 '
The Franchise Tax Board staff position, while tending to accept
some degree of in-state consultation on specifications, is not totally
clear as to what degree would be allowed.18 The staff would clearly
follow the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in a situation similar to
that presented by Iron Fireman Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commission.'
In Iron Fireman an Oregon-based seller engaged in substantial con-
sultation with the Washington buyer in Washington. Services included
special-problems indoctrination and training of the seller's engineers
and metallurgist (the latter selected jointly with buyer's officials) at
the buyer's Washington plant, as well as substantial course-of-produc-
tion inspection, testing, repair, redesign, installation and other problem-
177. Whether the activitiy is reasonably necessary for such persuasion or induce-
ment ought to depend on the technical complexity of the product sold, on legal restric-
tions governing its sale or the solicitation of orders therefore, and on the generally ac-
cepted or customary manner used in the industry to obtain orders for the product
through employee solicitation.
178. Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley, 109 N.J. Super. 22, 262 A.2d 213 (App. Div. 1970).
179. Conducting informal sessions to educate distributors or users of the prod-
uct on techniques in the use of the product after the product has already been sold would
appear to be a personal service outside the protection of Public Law 86-272. If such
services are rendered, it may be safer to render them in the state of seller's domicile or in
other states in which the seller is clearly subject to net income tax jurisdiction rather
than in every state of sale of the product.
While after-sales service such as that performed by the technicians in Clairol may
lead to future orders-and, in any case, is designed to retain customers and obtain re-
orders-it may be too far removed from the actual solicitation process to meet immunity
standards. Courts could reasonably conclude, as is implied in Clairol, that maintenance
of customer goodwill through the free furnishing of after-sale "continuing education" is
not within the concept of solicitation, even though formally conducted in a manner akin
to solicitation and promotion, where some substantial customer service activity is being
performed under the guise of promotion.
180. Informal comments, supra note 49.
181. 251 Ore. 227, 445 P.2d 126 (1968).
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solving activity.182  The Oregon Supreme Court found that the tax-
payer had engaged in more than Public Law 86-272 permissible
solicitation in Washington.
Pre- and post-sale engineering and consultation work may not be
clearly separable in the Oregon court's view of the situation. The
continued reference to "more than solicitation" would seem, however,
to indicate that the court chose to base its decision on the notion that
permissible solicitation activity had been exceeded.
183
c) SHIPMENT OR DELIVERY OF GOODS
INTO THE STATE OF SALE
Public Law 86-272 expressly provides immunity for "shipment
or delivery from a point outside the State."' 8  The law does not in-
dicate when or with what acts the immunity extended to delivery is
lost. Under the Franchise Tax Board's 1963 staff position, California
would have asserted corporate income tax jurisdiction where delivery
of goods into the state is made in company-operated vehicles. 185
A good argument can be made that delivery of products into the
state in company-operated vehicles should not destroy federal immunity
otherwise present. Beaman notes that the words "shipment or delivery"
in Public Law 86-272 suggest two different modes of getting goods
to the purchaser without a loss of federal immunity:
[S]hipment would indicate sending [the goods] by a carrier, such
as a railroad or a truckline. Delivery implies that the vendor
takes them to the vendee himself, or that the employees of the ven-
dor take them, or that they are taken there in conveyances owned
by, or hired by the vendor.' 86
Even discounting Beaman's argument based on the distinction be-
tween interstate and intrastate commerce, the fact that Congress used
the term delivery, in contrast to and as alternative to shipment, would
indicate that the 1963 Franchise Tax Board staff position may not com-
port with congressional intent. While delivery in company-operated ve-
hicles may be a significant in-state activity akin to the rendering of a
personal service, its protection seems expressly contemplated by the
federal act.
8 7'
This seems to be the expressed position of Oregon's tax admin-
182. Id. at 231, 445 P.2d at 127-28.
183. Id. at 231-32, 445 P.2d at 128.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1) (1964).
185. See note 106 supra.
186. BEAMAN, supra note 4, at 6.18.
187. Id.
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istrators. A published opinion of the Oregon State Tax Commission
notes that:
Deliveries into Oregon by an out-of-state corporation do not render
it subject to the state corporation income tax. Such activity alone
is not considered as establishing sufficient nexus to enforce corpo-
ration income tax liability. It would normally appear to be a part
of the solicitation of orders which would be exempt under Public
Law 86-272, or it would come within the protection of Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 74 S.Ct. 535.188
The Riblet Tramway decision is silent as to whether delivery is a
protected activity. 189  The Franchise Tax Board's recent statement
of activities which may result in loss of Public Law 86-272 im-
munity,' 9° however, does not include delivery in company-operated
vehicles. There is some indication that the staff has modified its
1963 position. The modification is desirable, at least where the
delivery vehicles are not owned by the out-of-state seller and hence
cannot be classified as significant company in-state property.' 91
Until the position of the Franchise Tax Board is clarified, the
safest course is to ship goods into the state by common carrier. The
informal comments of some Franchise Tax Board personnel indicate
that the official staff position is still that delivery of goods into this
state in company-owned vehicles will destroy federal immunity if such
delivery is a systematic and substantial part of the sales process.'
92
188. 2 CCI' STATE TAX CAS. REP., ORE. 201-816 (1967). See also Atlas
Foundry & Mach. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., ORE. 201-604
(Ore. Tax Ct., No. 128, 1965). In this writer's opinion the reference to Miller
Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), is unnecessary and inapposite. Miller Bros.
seems to be based on the quantitative rather than the qualitative insufficiency of the de-
livery activities there conducted. It is submitted that delivery is a protected activity, re-
gardless of the frequency with which it is conducted, not because of constitutional but
because of federal statutory protection accorded to such activity.
189. Riblet Tramway Co., 4 CCH STATE TAX CAS. REP., CAL. % 203-786 (State
Bd. Equal. 1967).
190. See note 147 supra.
191. Both the property interest in the delivery vehicles and the presence of the
vehicles in the state should be limited as much as possible. Thus, the out-of-state seller
should seriously consider leasing the delivery vehicles outside the state of delivery, and
should make certain that they are not garaged in the state of delivery and do not spend
any more time there than is necessary to make the actual delivery.
192. Informal comments, supra note 49. Interesting questions are presented by
the 1970 Consumer Warranty Act (new California Civil Code sections 1790-95) ef-
fective March 1, 1971, which, by imposing broad liability for repair, replacement or
reimbursement upon the out-of-state seller or manufacturer of defective consumer
goods covered by express warranties or representations as to their fitness or value,
encourages foreign sellers to maintain or engage in-state repair, replacement or pick-up
facilities. If the out-of-state manufacturer, distributor, or seller maintains an in-state
pick-up service for defective goods covered by express warranty, is the seller outside the
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Clearly, if a separate charge is made for the delivery, it will be consid-
ered a local personal service sufficient to destroy the out-of-state seller's
immunity.19 3
d) IN-STATE AID IN INSTALLATION AND INSPECTION
OF PRODUCTS SOLD
Another type of activity which may be outside the protected
scope of solicitation and of permitted shipment or delivery of the
product sold involves the degree of technical advice or aid which the
out-of-state seller may render in connection with the installation of the
product sold. Technical advice with respect to installation, assist-
ance in setting up the product shipped into the state or inspection of
the assembled product would probably be considered activity unpro-
tected by Public Law 86-272.194
Both the Franchise Tax Board's Guide to Corporations and recent
informal conversations with staff personnel' 95 indicate that in-state
assembly and installation of products properly solicited, sold and de-
livered in accordance with Public Law 86-272 may cause loss of fed-
eral immunity. This is especially true if such activities are a regular
and substantial part of the total sales effort and are performed by the
foreign seller's in-state representatives.
In Riblet Tramway the California State Board of Equalization
opinion notes that "after delivery of the parts and materials the erec-
tion of the entire ski lift would be performed by the vendee or by in-
dependent contractors hired by the vendee.' 1 96  Apparently none of
the erection work was done by the out-of-state sellers. But the Board
of Equalization stated that mere "inspections constituted significant
activity which was separate and distinct from the solicitation per-
formed in this state."' 97  The same panel, therefore, would in all
probability have considered that any actual aid or engineering advice
in the erection of the ski lifts likewise would have exceeded permissible
solicitation.
protection accorded by Public Law 86-272? If the State of California were to require
an out-of-state seller to maintain such warranty service center in this state, would
California be required to refrain from using the existence of such a center, or at least
of facilities for the pick-up and return of defective merchandise, as a method of taking
away from the out-of-state seller the protection accorded by Public Law 86-272?
193. Informal comments, supra note 49.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 4 CCH STATE TAx CAs. REP., CAL. 11 203-786, at 13,350 (State Bd. Equal.
1967).
197. Id. at 13,351 (emphasis added).
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The board distinguished inspection from permitted solicitation,
rather than from permitted delivery or shipment into California. This
may indicate a belief on the part of the board that shipment or delivery
into California are acts which must be strictly limited to the plain mean-
ing of the words and allow for no interpretational latitude. Such an
attitude limits Public Law 86-272 protection in the sale of complex
machinery or equipment requiring on-site erection or installation at
the buyer's place of business. Franchise Tax Board staff personnel have
informally indicated that they will press for this limitation.19
A certain amount of in-state installation or set-up work involving
highly complex machinery or equipment should be allowed, if only be-
cause the out-of-state company may be subject to substantial liability
in tort for injury or loss resulting from improperly installed equipment.
At least in the case of products where sufficient knowledge of the
technical intricacies requisite to proper functioning is available only to
the seller, he ought to be allowed to perform such supervision and post-
installation inspection as is reasonably necessary to protect himself
against traditional liability for negligence, if not strict liability in tort, or
from liabilities on account of breach of implied or statutorily imposed
warranty. 199
3. Credit Checks, Securing the Sales Price, Maintaining and
Enforcing Purchase Money Security
The third category of activities closely related to, but potentially
outside Public Law 86-272 protected activity involves the extent of
employee in-state activity in (a) closing sales or (b) protecting the
seller's rights under the agreement of sale. Public Law 86-272 pro-
tection is afforded only where the sale is technically made or closed
at the out-of-state office.200
California Franchise Tax Regulation 23040(b) indicates that
198. Informal comments, supra note 49.
199. Riblet Tramway Co., 4 CCH STATE TAX CAS. REP., CAL. 203-786, at
13,350 (State Bd. Equal. 1967), expressly recognizes that the right of inspection
reserved under the sales contract involved in that case was "provided in order to
prevent any possible liability to third persons and to disclaim any liability under the
parts warranty to the customer if an improper installation was not corrected by the cus-
tomer." Nevertheless, the Board of Equalization found that such inspections were "a
significant activity which was separate and distinct from the solicitation performed in
the State." Id. at 13,351. It is suggested that better public policy, consistent with
California's extension of responsibility in the area of products liability, would be to
allow inspection without destroying Public Law 86-272 protection.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1964).
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salesman "taking orders" for products of the out-of-state seller in this
state will destroy the selling company's federal immunity from Califor-
nia tax jurisdiction. This, however, is vestigial language retained from
the pre-Public Law 86-272 wording of the regulation 20 1 when Cali-
fornia, following a broad reading of West Publishing Co.,2°2 consid-
ered systematic and regular in-state solicitation of orders for the sale
of goods through local representatives sufficient for jurisdictional
nexus. 203 At present, mere physical taking and receipt of the order by
the employee contemporaneously with or subsequent to the solicitation
effort, where the receipt of the order is only for the purpose of transmit-
tal or forwarding the same for approval or rejection to the seller's out-
of-state office, would seem to be a protected activity.20 4 The recent
California Board of Equalization decision in Appeal of E. F. Timme &
Son, Inc.20 5 seems to assume without express comment that the minis-
terial functions of in-state salesmen who take orders for out-of-state
forwarding is not a ground for denial of Public Law 86-272 protec-
tion.
206
The acceptance of a deposit with the order taken, the giving of
assurances that any order submitted will be accepted or negotiation of
the price or terms of sale by the seller's representative are all signs
that a binding agreement between the out-of-state seller and prospec-
tive in-state purchaser has been concluded within the state. There-
fore, these activities would arguably fall outside the protected scope
of solicitation.207 But the extent to which such activities indicate an
in-state commitment to accept the order is uncertain.
On the one hand, orders are obviously solicited for the purpose
of accepting as many as possible with due regard to the seller's credit
requirements. Congress must have been aware of this function of
solicitation. On the other hand, the requirement of sending orders out
of the state for approval or rejection must be intended to have some
substance. Therefore, in-state acts which tend to diminish the need
201. See note 44 supra.
202. West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, aff'd per
curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
203. Informal comments, supra note 49.
204. "Section 101(a)(1) states that the order must be sent outside the state for
approval or rejection. Since it does not specify the identity of the sender, it appears to
be immaterial whether the customer sends it, or gives it to the salesman who does the
sending. Likewise the mode of sending is immaterial." BEAMAN, supra note 4, at 6.14.
205. 4 CCH STATE TAX CAS. REP., CAL. 1 204-045 (State Bd. Equal. 1969).
206. Id. at 13,605.
207. Informal comments, supra note 49.
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for or make a total sham of the already highly formal out-of-state
approval or rejection phase of the interstate solicitation process
would seem to be properly outside the protection intended by Congress.
In Herff Jones Co. v. State Tax Commission211 the Oregon Su-
preme Court considered the effect of taking deposits upon Public Law
86-272 tax immunity. Certain agents, characterized by the court
as the out-of-state seller's representatives, solicited orders for the plain-
tiff-appellant's products (apparently school rings) at Oregon schools.
The court noted that these representatives were "required by plaintiff
to secure a five dollar deposit on each ring sold."2 9  To be sure, re-
ceipt of deposits was not the sole activity characterized as in-state ac-
tivity exceeding permissible solicitation, but it was one of three or four
factors expressly noted by the court. 210  The staff opinion of the Cali-
fomia Franchise Tax Board seems to be that Herff Jones will be re-
lied upon by California to deny Public Law 86-272 protection to
the foreign corporation whose in-state solicitors regularly accept de-
posits.
211
Similarly (although no decided cases have addressed themselves
directly to this problem), where the out-of-state seller's representatives
give assurances that out-of-state acceptance of the order is a mere for-
mality, logic dictates that federally permitted in-state activity has been
exceeded. It can be argued, however, that so long as the employees
use order forms which indicate that the order is subject to out-
of-state approval, the out-of-state seller would seem to have done
enough to avoid a charge of having clothed its in-state solicitors with
apparent authority to accept orders and to bring itself within the formal
requirements of the federal law.2 12  The resolution of problems such
as this must await future court decisions or administrative rulings.
Two recent Oregon decisions shed some light on the status of in-
state negotiations of price and terms of sale. In Iron Fireman211 the
substantially of the Washington negotiations seemed to provide an al-
208. 247 Ore. 404, 430 P.2d 998 (1967).
209. Id. at 407, 403 P.2d at 999.
210. The Oregon Supreme Court noted as follows: "Aside from the actual solicita-
tion of orders, the salesmen also collect an initial deposit on merchandise ordered, and
forward such deposits to plaintiff. The sales representatives on occasion also collect the
balance due on the merchandise when it is delivered to the school. The sales represen-
tatives may also do occasional collection work for plaintiff in order to prevent their own
commission from being reduced." Id. at 412, 430 P.2d at 1002.
211. Informal comments, supra note 49.
212. BEAMAN, supra note 4, at 6.17.
213. Iron Fireman Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 251 Ore. 227, 445 P.2d 126
(1968).
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ternative ground for the court's finding of conduct outside the scope
of Public Law 86-272 solicitation, even though the court's pri-
mary emphasis was on the engineering, testing and supervisions activi-
ties of the Oregon seller in Washington. Seller's representatives in
Herff Jones, while they were required to contact their out-of-state
office "if the salesman [desired] to lower the price," nevertheless had
some in-state negotiation discretion which could have been addi-
tional reason for the court's finding of "more than solicitation." '214
Conversations with Franchise Tax Board personnel indicate that any
regular and systematic in-state negotiation of price and terms of sale
would lead the board to treat such activities of the out-of-state com-
pany's local representatives as more than solicitation of orders and
disallow Public Law 86-272 immunity.
2 15
Complex transactions may require extensive negotiation between
the prospective buyer and the seller or his representative. Exten-
sive negotiating activity conducted in the prospective taxing state may
of itself destroy federal immunity. Immunity will most certainly be lost
if the seller's representative has the power and apparent authority to
commit the seller on any part of the overall transaction.216 All ne-
gotiations should be clearly prefaced by written and oral disclaimers
on the part of the company or its representative as to the required out-
of-state approval of any points negotiated on behalf of the seller.
The Franchise Tax Board staff has indicated that credit investiga-
tion and approval, while it could be considered an integral part of the
pre-sale solicitation, may destroy federal immunity2 '7 if conducted in this
state by the foreign seller's employees or representatives. Beaman in-
dicates that because of the decision in B. F. Goodrich Co. v. State,
218
"many advisers still recommend that the service of credit approval be
purchased from independent agencies until the point is cleared up."219
The Franchise Tax Board staff's position is simply that credit investi-
gation by the out-of-state seller's personnel, like in-state manufactur-
ing or administrative activity, is not solicitation and therefore not pro-
tected. 20
While sale on credit and retention of a purchase money security
214. Herff Jones Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 Ore. 404, 430 P.2d 998 (1967).
215. Informal comments, supra note 49.
216. Id.
217. See notes 106 & 147 supra. Informal comments of Franchise Tax Board Staff
personnel, supra note 49, confirm that position.
218. 38 Wash. 663, 231 P.2d 325 (1951).
219. BEAMAN, supra note 4, at 6.14-.15.
220. Informal comments, supra note 49.
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interest in the product sold will not destroy federal immunity,221 Fran-
chise Tax Board personnel have indicated that enforcement of an in-
stallment sales agreement through informal methods involving in-
state representatives, by in-state legal action on behalf of the out-of-
state seller or by repossession of goods for the seller's benefits will be
considered in-state activity beyond the protection of Public Law 86-
272.22 Consequently, the best course of action for the prudent out-
of-state seller may be to sell installment sales contracts or open accounts
to independent financing or collection agencies.
22
1
4. Corporate Managerial or Supervisory Presence Related
to the Solicitation Effort
Finally, some consideration should be given to the organization of
the in-state sales solicitation effort. Clearly, any type of regularly
maintained sales or administrative office in this state would destroy
Public Law 86-272 protectionY.2 4  The difficult question is the ex-
tent to which the salesmen may meet for regular briefing or instruc-
tion sessions and the extent to which an out-of-state company may
supervise in-state solicitation efforts through the nontransient in-state
presence of supervisory or administrative personnel using their homes
or temporary quarters such as hotel or motel rooms or apartment
houses. The recently distributed Guide to Corporations indicates
that the "supervision of personnel . . . conducting training courses or
lectures, investigation or apportionment of agents or distributors .
may all be activities not within the protection of the federal act. 25
In CIBA the court noted that those of the drug company's twelve
Missouri detail men who covered the St. Louis area
221. See notes 49 & 106 supra.
222. Informal comments, supra note 49.
223. In National Bellas Hess Inc. v. Department of Revenue the three dissenters
noted that a substantial part of Bellas Hess' sales was on credit. 368 U.S. 753, 761
(1967). The majority's failure to comment on this use of credit would seem to indicate
that mere sale on credit, without more, would be insufficient for nexus purposes either
under constitutional law or under the federal act's "solicitation plus" standard.
224. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 454,
456 (1959). See also BEAMAN, supra note 4, at 6.15-.16 discussing the Talmadge Senate
floor amendment which struck from the committee print of S. 2524 a third paragraph of
section 101(a) of what later became Public Law 86-272, This paragraph would have
granted protection to an office the primary use and purpose of which was to receive and
forward orders for sales of the out-of-state seller's goods. Beaman notes that while the
sales office provision might have been considered surplusage by some Senators who
voted for its deletion, the more likely interpretation is congressional intent not to exempt
such operations from state tax jurisdiction.
225. See note 119 supra.
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assemble periodically for sales meetings. These meetings are
called by the district manager, also a representative, and are held
in St. Louis, usually in motel rooms. These meetings are of an
educational nature. Representatives acquire information on
particular products to be sold and also are instructed on company
policy. 2
26
California Franchise Tax Board personnel have informally indicated
that similar activity conducted in California would be challenged as
"solicitation plus," in excess of that activity permitted under Public
Law 86-272.227
In-state representatives soliciting orders are of course neither pre-
vented from meeting with each other nor from exchanging information
among themselves. However, the designation by the out-of-state seller
of one of its in-state solicitors as a sales supervisor or manager charged
with any organizational, surpervisory or administrative duties would
trigger the Franchise Tax Board's claim of California activity outside
the scope permitted by Public Law 86-272. The regular or syste-
matic presence in California of any administrative or managerial per-
sonnel in addition to sales solicitors would likewise assure such a juris-
dictional claim.228
Similarly, the regular and systematic hiring and firing of personnel
by the out-of-state seller's personnel manager who is either in the state
or who enters the state for such purpose or for the investigation and
appointment of agents and distributors would indicate corporate pres-
ence in more than the solicitation context.229 This should be true,
however, only where the agents or distributors do not qualify as "in-
dependent contractors" under Public Law 86-272.2o
The Oregon decision in Briggs & Stratton23 is relevant on the
issue of in-state presence of personnel with some administrative or
managerial discretion. There the tax court repeatedly referred to the
226. State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382
S.W.2d 645, 648 (Mo. 1964).
227. Informal comments, supra note 49; Guide to Corporations, supra note 119.
228. Informal comments, supra note 49.
229. Id.; Guide to Corporations, supra note 119.
230. Obviously, the federal protection accorded to the seller for sales made by
properly qualified independent contractors might mean little if the out-of-state seller were
not entitled to enter the state for the purpose of investigating and appointing agents and
distributors who could qualify as independent contractors under Public Law 86-272.
The Franchise Tax Board staff opinion on whether such in-state investigation or appoint-
ment of persons sought to be qualified as independent contractors would disqualify the
out-of-state seller from Public Law 86-272 seems to be divided.
231. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, CCH STATE TAX REP., ORE.
11201-929 (Ore. Tax Ct. No. 295, 1968).
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representative's title as sales and service supervisor. It was pointed
out that he had certain supervisory powers in relation to the inspection
of dealers' tools, shops and inventories, the conduct of training courses
and lectures, including proper attendance by dealers' personnel, and
that "he also gives approval to the appointment by [the seller's chief
independent Oregon distributor] of service distributors and serv-
ice dealers."2"2  The implications of this decision for disallowing im-
munity in cases of in-state managerial or supervisory activity are cer-
tain to be followed by the California Franchise Tax Board.23   It
should be pointed out that the decision did not consider in-state activ-
ity in appointing prime independent contractors. While the sales and
service representative's Oregon activities in approving the appointment
of subdistributors and dealers might have shed some doubt on the
prime distributor's status as an independent contractor, 23' no ques-
tion was before the court as to whether such appointment-approval
activity would have been outside Public Law 86-272 if it had been
conducted with respect to a prime contractor.
C. Independent Contractors and Their
Permitted Activities
The federal act allows an out-of-state seller to consummate in-
state sales through independent contractors-who are in turn permitted
to have sales offices in the state-without loss of federal immunity.
235
Two questions arise: (1) what is necessary to retain protected "in-
dependent contractor" status under the federal act; (2) what are the
limits of the activity permitted, within the meaning of the federal act,
to independent contractors in the state which are not permitted to the
out-of-state seller's representatives.
1. Problems Underlying the Employment of a
Related Independent Contractor
Public Law 86-272 provides a general definition of an inde-
dependent contractor, but it does not restrict the affiliation which an in-
232. Id. at 12,497-98.
233. Informal comments, supra note 49.
234. The Oregon Tax Court expressly noted that "it is not necessary to decide
whether plaintiff's activities through Tracey as an independent contractor serving more
than one principal are in excess of sales or the solicitation of order for sales under 15
USCA sections 381(a)(1)(c) . . . because plaintiff's activities through its sales and
service supervisor in Oregon are clearly in excess of solicitation of orders." Id. at
12,498.
235. 15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (1964).
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dependent contractor may have with the out-of-state seller. The most
obvious question is whether an out-of-state seller's wholly owned sub-
sidiary may be an independent contractor within the meaning of the
act.2
36
According to Franchise Tax Board Legal Ruling No. 91, issued
prior to the enactment of Public Law 86-272, stock ownership
alone does not destroy the independence which distinguishes a broker,
dealer or contractor from the corporation's agents or representative
"if the subsidiary may deal with corporations other than [the out-of-
state seller], maintains separate offices and exercises independent dis-
cretion.
'23 7
The extent to which it may be practical for an out-of-state seller
to allow its in-state subsidiary to act as broker for other companies
than its parent and to exercise "independent discretion' depends to
some extent on the federal act's requirement that the independent con-
tractor be "engaged in selling, or soliciting orders for the sale of, tangi-
ble personal property for more than one principal and who holds
himself out as such in the regular course of his business activities
... ,,2s8 Must the tangible personal property handled by the inde-
pendent contractor for more than one principal involve the same or sim-
ilar product lines, or may the independent contractor handle comple-
mentary, noncompeting or totally unrelated product lines for more than
one principal and still be accorded protected status?
239
236. See also Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation
of Interstate Business, 75 HiA.Av. L. REv. 953, 1008 (1962): "[Tlhe statute [does not]
adequately define 'independent contractor;' it is unclear whether, for example, that term
includes a subsidiary corporation [citing 105 CONG. REc. 16,493 (1959)]."
237. 1 CCH STATE TAx CAS. REP., CAL. I 10-064-a.20 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
FTB Ruling No. 91].
238. 15 U.S.C. § 381(d) (1964).
239. The status of an agent as an "independent contractor" under prior California
tax law did not require that an "independent contractor" be engaged in selling for more
than one principal. Thus where a distributor for an out-of-state manufacturer of hand
tools (1) invested his own capital in the distributorship, (2) had the authority to deter-
mine the price at which goods were sold by him, (3) had control over the hiring, direc-
tion and compensation of his employees, (4) retained the accounts receivable, (5) bore
the risk of operating expenses and losses and (6) retained the opportunity for greater
profit from sound management, the State Board of Equalization found the distributor to
be "an independent contractor operating a business on his own behalf and for his own
benefit" despite the fact that he sold only the goods of a single out-of-state manufacturer.
Snap-On Tools Corp., 4 CCH STATE TAX REP., CAL. Y 201-200 (State Bd. of Equal.
1958). This case, read in light of FTB Ruling No. 91 indicating that stock ownership
alone does not destroy "independence," would seem to indicate that the handling of only
noncompetitive product lines by a subsidiary otherwise qualifying as an independent
contractor would not destroy Public Law No. 86-272 immunity.
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If the federal act is given a broad reading, an in-state distributor
of equipment and furniture would seem to qualify for independent
contractor status although wholly owned by X, an out-of-state manu-
facturer of office desks and chairs, where he sells not only X's desks
and chairs but also sells Y's typewriters and adding machines. The
same system of distribution would not, however, qualify his principal
for federal immunity if the act is interpreted narrowly and the in-state
independent contractor is required to sell office desks and chairs for
more than one out-of-state seller of such furniture.
The policy underlying the federal immunity accorded to the in-
state consummation of sales by independent contractors ought to be
that their income from such activity is in any event taxable in the state
of sale. So long as independent contractor and principal are dealing
at arm's length, the independent contractor would normally obtain a
fair portion of the profit which would have gone to the out-of-state
seller on direct in-state sales without a contractor. This "fair por-
tion" probably represents a fair approximation to the out-of-state
seller's total net income attributable to sales activity in the taxing state
which the seller would have had in the absence of the independent
contractor. Thus, selling through independent contractors is a practi-
cal way of letting the marketplace determine what portion of the ag-
gregate net profit on any item of sale is attributable to the in-state
activity. This marketplace determination of the sales-activity profit
properly allocable to the state of sale is not likely to be substantially
biased, regardless of whether the item of sale is competitive or non-
competitive with items handled by the in-state contractor for other
manufacturers. The in-state contractor will have the same incentive
to obtain the maximum sales commission or the minimum wholesale
price for himself regardless of whether the item is competitive or non-
competitive. The proper interpretation of the federal act ought to
permit a local distributor to handle noncompeting product lines without
destroying the protection accorded his out-of-state principal. 240
240. Even if the Franchise Tax Board recognizes the independent contractor status
of a subsidiary of the out-of-state seller engaged only in sales of noncompeting products
for principals other than the parent, the board may urge that the subsidiary is engaged in
a unitary business with the parent principal under tests such as unity of (1) ownership,
(2) operations and (3) use. For a recent affirmation of that test, see Chase Brass &
Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 4 CCH STATE TAX REP., CAL. 204-306 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App., 1970), appeal denied for want of jurisdiction, 32 U.S.L.W. 3272 (U.S. Dec.
21, 1970). See also Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of
Income, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42, 45-59 (1960). If this back door attack on a subsidiary's
independent contractor status is successful, then independent contractor status for an
out-of-state seller's in-state subsidiary is likely to be very short lived.
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In California the Franchise Tax Board staff is likely to insist on
strict observance of the requirements of the federal law that an independ-
ent contractor be engaged in making or soliciting sales for more than
one principal and that he hold himself out as such in the regular course
of his business activities only where the principal and the claimed "in-
dependent contractor" are affiliated through stock ownership.241 Where
no such affiliation exists, such dealing and holding out for more than one
principal is not likely to be required so long as the other tests of "inde-
pendence" as developed under California case law are satisfied.242
Thus, as was seen in the case of an out-of-state seller's in-state advertis-
ing, so long as it does not involve an out-of-state seller's in-state use of
company employees or property, the extensive use of truly independ-
ent in-state exclusive dealers or distributors is another aspect of Cali-
fornia tax jurisdictional practice which is more favorable to the out-of-
state seller than necessarily required by Public Law 86-272 as the same
has been applied by other jurisdictions.
2. Permissible Activities of Independent Contractors
An independent contractor may make sales and may maintain an in-
state sales office "on behalf of" his out-of-state principal in addition
to conducting the solicitation activities permitted to the out-of-state
It may be argued, however, that the unitary business line of attack should be as
unsuccessful in avoiding federal immunity as it was in Appeal of Joyce, Inc., 4 CCH
STATE TAX REP., CAL. 203-523 (State Bd. Equal. 1966). Thus, if an out-of-state
seller can establish that its in-state subsidiary was an independent contractor, the fact
that it was engaged in a unitary business with that independent contractor should no
more allow California to claim income tax jurisdiction over properly executed in-state
sales by the independent contractor than the fact of properly solicited sales by U.S.
Shoe's sales representatives did in the actual case. But see Tonka Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Taxation, 284 Minn. 185, 169 N.W.2d 589 (1969), where the court, in finding
that certain representatives were not independent contractors noted that "these repre-
sentatives had an exclusive territory and [were] forbidden by . . . contract with Tonka
from handling any competing product lines." Id. at 187, 169 N.W.2d at 591.
Moreover, Tonka's New York representative, while he "had many of the attributes which
characterize an independent contractor," was not held to be independent for several rea-
sons, one of which was that "he could not deal in competing products." Id. at 191, 169
N.W.2d at 593-94.
241. FrB Ruling No. 91, supra note 237 (emphasis added). This would seem-,
at least in the case of principal and agent related through stock ownership-to imply the
requirement of such dealing and "holding out" for more than one principal even in the
absence of federal law.
242. Informal comments, supra note 49. Such tests are discussed in Irvine Co. v.
McColgan, 26 Cal. 2d 160, 157 P.2d 847 (1945); Snap-On Tools Corp., 4 CCH STATE
TAX REP., CAL. f 202-265 (State Bd. Equal. 1963); FTB Ruling No. 91, supra note
237.
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seller's direct representatives.243 It might be argued that any other ad-
ditional activity of independent contractors must be strictly limited to
the language of the federal law to retain immunity status.244 Thus,
promotional, technical and other service activities prohibited to in-
state representatives could likewise be prohibited to the independent
contractor of an out-of-state seller. Since an independent contractor
would, however, be entitled to complete sales, 21 5 he ought not to be
subject to the limitations on contractual negotiation, execution of offers,
acceptances or actual sales contracts, nor to those limitations preventing
solicitors from accepting either deposits or the entire sales price.
The question of what activities-other than making or soliciting
sales-an independent contractor may perform on behalf of his out-of-
state principal under the federal act may currently be a moot point un-
der the California law. Informal comments of Franchise Tax Board's
legal staff24c indicate that for tax jurisdictional purposes, the business
activities of an independent contractor are not to be equated with the
business activities of his principal. 247  Thus, an advertising, promo-
tional, technical, installation or collection service or other activity per-
formed by the independent contractor with respect to the out-of-state
seller's goods or customers will not be attributed to the out-of-state
principal for tax jurisdictional purposes.248
243. See 15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (1964).
244. It has been correctly pointed out that "the maintenance of an office by
an independent contractor does not [destroy Federal immunity] if the sole activi-
ties of the independent contractor in the host state on behalf of the interstate seller con-
sist of making sales of tangible personal property, or soliciting orders for such sales. The
italicized words mean that the independent contractor may conduct other types of activi-
ties on behalf of himself or other vendors." See BEAMAN, supra note 4, at 6.21. The
federal statute, nevertheless, could be construed to foreclose federal immunity if other
activity is undertaken by the independent contractor which also benefits the out-of-state
seller. Thus the performance of exclusive promotional activity by the contractor to in-
crease his sales could conceivably benefit the out-of-state seller's in-state representatives
even though these representatives otherwise had no contact with the independent con-
tractor. See id. at 6.21-.22 as to the possible immunity-destructive effect of repre-
sentatives utilizing the independent contractor's in-state office.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (1964).
246. Informal comments, supra note 49.
247. In this respect the Franchise Tax Board personnel seem to recognize the pol-
icy which has been suggested as underlying the express federal immunity provided by
section 101 (c) of the Interstate Income law. See text preceding note 240, supra.
248. Informal comments, supra note 49. It should be noted that even in jurisdic-
tions which have not adopted California's broad policy of activities allowed to indepen-
dent contractors, activities other than making or soliciting of sales for other principals
or for its own benefit may practically give the independent contractor greater latitude
to act for the out-of-state principal than would be accorded to the latter's soliciting rep-
resentatives. Thus, for example, if the independent contractor actually purchases not
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Franchise Tax Board staff personnel would claim jurisdiction over
the foreign, out-of-state seller (1) if any of its property is at any time in
the independent contractor's possession, or (2) if any of the foreign,
out-of-state based seller's in-state soliciting representatives use any
of the independent contractor's facilities to further their sales solici-
tation effort.
249
D. Nexus and Reverse Nexus
The passage of Public Law 86-272, and the introduction of
further proposed federal legislation to restrict the states' taxing power
under the recommendations of the Special Subcommittee's 1964 Re-
port, contributed in no small part to the adoption by California of the
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), sub-
stantially as recommended by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws. 50 Under UDITPA, a corporation
based or organized in California may escape the California net income
tax on a portion of its total world-wide income to the extent that it has
"income from business activity which is taxable both within and with-
out this state. .... 1"51 Formerly, income was allocated among the
states or countries in which the business was conducted.252 Whether or
insubstantial amounts of its out-of-state principal's goods, advertising and promotional
activities engaged in by the contractor with respect to those goods could be argued to be
activities conducted in its own behalf, and thus not destructive of immunity, even though
such advertising and promotion aid the direct sale or solicitation of goods on behalf of
the out-of-state seller which the contractor has not himself purchased for resale. See
also BEcmN, supra note 4, at 6.21-.22.
249. Informal comments, supra note 49. But see BEAMAN, supra note 4, at 6.21-
.22.
250. Cal. Stat. 1966, ch. 2, § 7, at 117-90 (codified at CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE
H8 25120-39).
251. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 25121.
252. Allocation or apportionment of income away from California's tax reach is
possible when "income is derived from or attributable to sources both within and
without" California. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25101. When income is so attributable
to this and to other states, the California tax "shall be measured by the net income
derived from or attributable to sources within this state .. " Id.
Prior to the adoption of UDITPA the determination of source of income for allo-
cation and apportionment purposes was made under the following statutory language:
"Such income shall be determined by an allocation upon the basis of sales, purchases,
expenses of manufacture, payroll, value and situs of tangible property or by reference to
any of these or other factors or by such method of allocation as is fairly calculated
to determine the net income derived from or attributable to sources within this State. In-
come from business carried on partly within and partly without this State shall be al-
located in such a manner as is fairly calculated to apportion such income among the
states or countries in which such business is conducted." Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 17,
§ 25101, at 1649 (emphasis added). Prior to 1939 the determinative factor for allo-
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not a California company was considered to be "conducting business"
outside of California was determined on the basis of whether the out-of-
state activities would have subjected the same company to California
corporate income tax jurisdiction if it had been an out-of-state company
conducting those activities in California. Just exactly what constituted
"conducting business" outside California was uncertain. It was prob-
ably something less than the pre-1939 "doing business" test, but some-
thing more than the test now applied under UDITPA. As a result of
UDITPA's more liberal and certain test, the question of sufficient nexus
to support tax jurisdiction outside California is certain to take on in-
creased importance for California-based companies.
At present whether a California taxpayer is taxable outside of
California is determined by Revenue and Taxation Code section 25122,
which provides:
For purposes of allocation and apportionment of income under
this act, a taxpayer is taxable in another state if (a) in that state
it is subject to a net income, a franchise tax for the privilege of
doing business, or a corporate stock tax, or (b) that state has
jurisdiction to subject the taxpayer to net income tax regardless
of whether, in fact, the state does or does not.
Thus, the extent of taxability of income of California-based cor-
porations (with respect to which no tax jurisdictional nexus question
exists) depends on the existence of possible taxability elsewhere. This
basis of actual or hypothetical taxability elsewhere may for convenience
be referred to as "reverse nexus. '253
cation or apportionment of income away from California was the "carrying on of
business .. . without this State." A substantial body of case law arose which de-
termined whether or not a corporation was doing business outside California. The
recurrent question was whether the activities of a California taxpayer's agents else-
where constituted doing business outside of California. The Franchise Tax Board, in
many instances, successfully argued that a California corporation's out-of-state represen-
tatives were "independent contractors." Therefore, as the business of the independent
contractor is not the business of his principal, the courts repeatedly found that California
corporations were not engaged in business elsewhere and thus were not entitled to allo-
cate or apportion income away from California. See, e.g., Irvine Co. v. McColgan, 26
Cal. 2d 160, 157 P.2d 847 (1946); H.C. Smith Oil Tool Co., P-H STATE & LocAL TAX
SERV., CAL. 13,287 (State Bd. Equal. 1962). Even the fact that the California tax-
payer had business property outside California was insufficient to permit allocation or
apportionment on the ground that "the ownership of property located outside the State
obviously does not in itself constitute doing business outside the State." Kasser Egg
Process Co., 1 CCH STATE TAX CAs. REP., CAL. 12-402,25 (State Bd. Equal. 1933).
See also California Dispatch Line, 1 CCH STAT. TAX CAS. REP., CAL. 12-402.251
(State Bd. Equal. 1939); Gilmore Oil Co., 1 CCH STATE TAx CAS. REP., CAL. 12-
402.251 (State Bd. Equal. 1939); Green Spot, Inc. 1 CCH STATE TAX CAs. REP., CAL.
12-402.254 (State Bd. Equal. 1939).
253. See 1 H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1, at 400-03.
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Thus the problem of minimally sufficient nexus is faced not
only by the foreign corporation with tenuous California contacts in
deciding whether to file a California corporate income tax return, but
also by the California corporation with tenuous out-of-state con-
tacts in deciding whether another state's actual or potential taxing
powers are such that income can either be allocated or apportioned out
of California. California tax administrators, and eventually the courts
of this state, will be called upon to determine standards upon which
California-based corporate taxpayers can rely in making such a deci-
sion. The determination of standards for deciding whether another
state's jurisdiction to tax reaches California-based corporate taxpayers
will inevitably influence the development of standards in the area of
minimum presence and activity sufficient to subject a foreign, out-of-
state based corporation to California income tax jurisdiction.
1. The Effect of Definitional Considerations
Section 25122 raises definitional questions wholly distinct from
the problem of determining the sufficiency of nexus for tax jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the question has arisen as to whether a California tax-
payer must be actually or merely potentially taxable in the foreign
jurisdiction. It has been suggested that application of UDITPA's
"taxable in another state" standard must satisfy a two-step test:
2 54
(1) if the out-of-state jurisdiction does actually levy one of the in-
come-related taxes listed in section 25122(a), the in-state taxpayer
must actually have complied with the out-of-state jurisdiction's tax laws
by filing a return and paying the tax due under that jurisdiction's
laws; and (2) if the out-of-state jurisdiction does not actually levy
one of the taxes listed in section 25122(a), the taxpayer will be
allowed to allocate-out income pursuant to section 25122(b) so
long as the taxpayer could constitutionally be subjected to such a
tax if it were to be enacted. The effect is to convert section 25122
into a multistate income tax compliance provision for the in-state
taxpayer seeking to apportion or allocate its total net income. In short,
only if the out-of-state jurisdiction could have, but did not impose one
of the enumerated income-related taxes, or if the in-state taxpayer ac-
tually complied with the out-of-state jurisdiction's tax laws, would the
in-state taxpayer be entitled under section 25122 to show that its
out-of-state activities would subject it to another jurisdiction's taxing
power.
254. The informal comments of Franchise Tax Board personnel indicate that one
influential tax administrator in Oregon is of this opinion. See note 49 supra.
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California Franchise Tax Board officials take a different view.
They do not consider the matter of actual compliance with the foreign
jurisdiction's tax laws of determining significance. The crucial factor,
as seen by the Franchise Tax Board staff, is whether the foreign juris-
diction (be it a state or foreign country) could impose one of the specifi-
cally described taxes under the Constitution and laws of the United
States upon the California-based corporation "by reason of its activi-
ties in such other state."2 55  The fact that potential tax jurisdiction
elsewhere must be based on the California taxpayer's "activities in such
other state" precludes California taxpayers from allocating or appor-
tioning in situations where California taxpayers place themselves under
another state's tax jurisdiction by voluntarily filing returns in or pay-
ing taxes to other states, and where such filing or paying would not be
required on the basis of the California corporation's activities in such
a state. 6  But if another state does impose one of the specifically
enumerated income related taxes, a failure of the California-based
corporation to file tax returns or to pay tax to the foreign jurisdiction
may be some evidence against the California-based corporation claim-
ing taxability in another state.
5 7
255. Franchise Tax Board comments regarding application of UDITPA, 4 CCH
STATE TAX REP., CAL., 203-548 (1967).
256. Informal comments, supra note 49. See also Signal Thread Co. v. King, 222
Tenn. 241, 435 S.W.2d 468 (1968), where the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to allow
assignment of a portion of the total net income of a Tennessee corporation out of that
state on the ground that the corporation was not "doing business" elsewhere for pur-
poses of Tennessee's apportionment law. The fact that the Tennessee corporation volun-
tarily paid North Carolina corporate income and franchise taxes was held insufficient to
allow apportionment. The court noted that "the bare fact the payment of applicable
taxes elsewhere was voluntary will not deprive a taxpayer of a lawful right to apportion,
[but] such a belated payment cannot absolve a taxpayer of liability to Tennessee un-
less it has carried the burden of showing that it actually was doing intrastate business
elsewhere." Id. at 256, 435 S.W.2d at 474.
257. Such nonreporting may be used as a type of admission against the taxpayer's
interest to show that the corporation itself did not consider itself taxable in the other
state. In practice, the Franchise Tax Board could determine that the California based
corporation was not taxable in the foreign jurisdiction, and thus shift to the taxpayer
the burden of proving taxability (in essence, the burden of proving the existence of
activities in the foreign jurisdiction which would have caused the loss of constitutional or
federal tax law immunity). Where the other jurisdiction has taxes of the income-related
types enumerated in section 25122 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, the
California-based corporation's failure to file a return and pay tax to the foreign juris-
diction actually imposing a tax of the enumerated type could present a substantial hurdle
to be overcome in meeting the burden of proof thus shifted to the taxpayer. Naturally,
testimony to this effect in a formal hearing before the State Board of Equalization
would constitute the type of public admission against interest which the out-of-state
jurisdiction could thereafter use to assert its own tax jurisdiction against the previously
noncomplying California taxpayer.
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Despite the above difference of opinion among state tax admin-
istrators as to the importance of compliance when one of the taxes
enumerated in section 25122(a) actually exists in the foreign
state, there seems to be no disagreement about the meaning of taxabil-
ity under 25122(b): the potential taxability of a corporation is
measured as though the foreign state chose to exercise its taxing
power under the full reach allowed by the Constitution of the United
States and by federal law.""' In other words, even if the state to
which the California taxpayer sought to allocate or apportion income
failed to take advantage of its power to tax to the extent allowed by
the Constitution or by federal law, out-of-state taxability is neverthe-
less established if the activities in the other state are sufficient to over-
come constitutional and federal statutory immunity standards.
259
258. Informal comments, supra note 49. The Committee on Uniform Income Tax
Regulations of the National Association of Tax Administrators, in its Statement of Pro-
posed Regulations, takes a similar position in Proposed Regulation 3(B): "(1) A tax-
payer is 'subject to' one of the taxes specified in [the Uniform Act] only if it carries
on business activities in another state. If the taxpayer voluntarily files and pays one or
more of such taxes when not required to do so by the laws of that state or pays a minimal
fee for qualification, organization or for the privilege of doing business in that state,
but (a) does not actually engage in business activities in that state, or (b) does actually
engage in some activity, not sufficient for nexus, and the minimum tax bears no relation
to the corporation's activities within such state, the taxpayer is not 'subject to' one of
the specified taxes within the meaning of [the Uniform Act].
"(2) The concept of taxability in another state is based upon the premise that every
state in which the taxpayer is engaged in business activities may impose an income tax
even though every state does not do so. In states which do not, other types of taxes may
be imposed as a substitute for an income tax. Therefore, only those taxes enumerated in
[the Uniform Act] which may be considered as basically revenue raising rather than
regulatory measures shall be considered in determining whether the taxpayer is 'tax-
able' in another state."
259. Thus, the question of taxability elsewhere does not present true conflict of
laws issues. The question is purely one of California local law with possible constitu-
tional law overtones on the question of fair apportionment. See note 321 infra. The
resolution of such constitutional questions is, of course, in the first instance, likewise
a matter of California law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
The National Association of Tax Administrators' Uniform Tax Regulations Com-
mittee's proposed Regulation 3(C) likewise views the matter of "taxability elsewhere"
as a subject to be determined by looking at the potential taxability of a foreign taxpayer
to the full extent allowed by the Constitution and laws of the United States: "The second
test in the [Uniform Act (e.g., CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 25122(b))] applies if
the taxpayer's business activities are sufficient to give the state jurisdiction to impose
a net income tax under the Constitution and statutes of the United States. Jurisdiction to
tax is not present where the state is prohibited from imposing the tax by reason of the
provisions of Public Law 86-272, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 381-385. In the case of any 'state,' as
defined in Section 1(g) of the Act, other than a state of the United States or political sub-
division of such state, the determination of whether such 'state' has jurisdiction to sub-
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2. Uniform Standards for Nexus and Reverse Nexus
California's criterion for allowing allocation or apportionment is
not actual taxation of income outside California, but rather the full
hypothetical jurisdiction of another state or foreign country to tax a
California-based company on the basis of activity or income arising
there.26 0  If California were to take full advantage of the tax jurisdic-
tional power it ascribes to other states in its attitude towards allocation
or apportionment by California-based companies with respect to for-
eign corporations doing business within California, uniformity in stand-
ards would be achieved. A uniform standard to determine the satis-
faction of both nexus and reverse nexus requirements would be easier
to apply. It also has a certain ring of elemental "fairness," and would
tend to further the goal of uniform apportionment of corporate income
tax among the states.
Neither constitutional principles nor the Federal Interstate In-
come Act require application of the same standard for both reverse
nexus and nexus purposes.20 1 Thus the standard for reverse nexus is
purely a matter of California law, subject to certain implied constitu-
tional requirements of fair apportionment.20 2
ject the taxpayer to a net income tax shall be made as though the jurisdictional stan-
dards applicable to a state of the United States applied in that 'state.' If jurisdiction is
otherwise present, such 'state' is not considered as without jurisdiction by reason of the
provisions of a treaty between that state and the United States."
260. See note 258 supra.
261. Hawes v. William L. Bonnell Co., 116 Ga. 184, 156 S.E.2d 536 (1967). In
this case the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a decision in favor of a Georgia cor-
poration that had allocated and apportioned its total net income between Georgia and
other states in which, under the court's interpretation of Georgia law, it would have been
"doing business" in Georgia if it had been a foreign company engaging in activities in
Georgia which were identical to its actual out-of-Georgia activities. The Georgia Reve-
nue Commissioner conceded that the Georgia law definition of "doing business' in
Georgia would be equally applicable to "doing business" outside of Georgia but con-
tended that the federal act must be read into the Georgia law, "compelling the conclu-
sion that activities such as are here set out are not taxable insofar as a foreign corpora-
tion with such activities in Georgia are concerned, a fortiori, preventing an exclusion of
a Georgia corporation's income where its similar activities are conducted out of state.
Id. at 190, 156 S.E.2d at 541.
"Regardless of the soundness of the first proposition the second does not of neces-
sity follow and is demonstrably fallacious. . . . The federal act at best impliedly
modified the 1950 Act insofar as a foreign corporation's activities within the state are
concerned. The fact that attempting to tax a foreign corporation under that provision
might now run afoul of the federal statute would not affect the provision as to Georgia
corporations with described activities in other states. The federal law does not en-
deavor to pre-empt that area. It did not in any manner relate to the Act's provisions
insofar as a domestic corporation was concerned." Id. at 191, 156 S.E.2d at 541.
262. See note 259 supra.
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In answers to the "reverse nexus" portion of the Special Subcom-
mittee's nexus questionnaire, California tax administrators indicated
that a dual standard, favoring California-based corporations seeking to
allocate or apportion income out of California's tax reach, was in ef-
fect.203 This duality of standards has apparently been rejected by
California since 1963. Recent conversations with Franchise Tax
Board personnel indicate that the developing California jurisdictional
rules will be applied equally to the nexus and reverse nexus situa-
tions. 2
64
Of course, practical difference in treatment may still arise. For
one thing, the California tax administrators' means of verifying activity
claimed to be taking place in other jurisdictions are limited. Where
revenue consequences are not substantial, the administrators may be
more inclined to accept at face value the domestic taxpayer's claim
of out-of-state activity than to accept a foreign concern's statement
as to in-state activities, which can more easily be verified by inspec-
tion of in-state operation and perusal of local records. 265  Never-
theless, the development and application of uniform standards for
nexus and reverse nexus would be not only commendable, but also an
important step towards reducing the aggregate burden of taxation of
multistate business.2 6
As will be noted shortly, nexus and reverse nexus standards would
be nonequivalent at the lower levels of marginal California or out-of-
state contacts in the event that California adopts minimum quanti-
tative jurisdiction rules to supplement existing constitutional, federal
and state qualitative rules. This lack of equivalence at the lower levels
of contacts aside, uniformity in nexus and reverse nexus standards
should be retained as far as possible.2 6r
263. 1 H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1, at 239-42. Thus California's tax ad-
ministrators in 1963 considered certain of the activities described in the chart which is
referred to in note 106 supra, which, if conducted by a foreign, out-of-state based corpo-
ration in California would not have been sufficient for a claim of tax jurisdiction by
California to be a sufficient contact with another state to allow apportionment by a
California-based company whether it engaged in such activities regularly, occasionally or
rarely. As has been noted, this may have been due to the fact that under the then ex-
isting "locus of employee sales activity" test, little assignment of income away from
California would in any case have been possible.
264. Informal comments, supra note 49.
265. Id.




H. Summary and Recommendations
California's present jurisdictional standards are vague and unen-
forceable. When there is ambiguity in the tax law, the taxpayer
is at the mercy of the tax administrator. And for years California
tax administrators have ignored the collection of legally collectible
taxes where tax liability of out-of-state firms was small.
26 8
The foregoing discussion has sought to clarify first the constitu-
tional standards of minimum nexus required for state net income tax
jurisdiction, and second, the income tax jurisdictional standards ac-
tually being applied-particularly in California-as a result of state
legislative, judicial and administrative response to Public Law 86-272.
An analysis of the Northwestern States line of cases has suggested
that the basic constitutional minimum nexus criterion for state income
tax jurisdiction over foreign corporations is the physical presence
of the foreign company within the potential taxing state through in-
state property, employees or activities. "Economic presence"-the
mere receipt of income from sales of property or services to a buyer in
the potential taxing state, without more-is a criterion advocated by a
Supreme Court minority, by various commentators and by at least one
state's highest court. But it has not yet received the Supreme Court's
approval.
Superimposed upon the criterion of physical presence seems to be
a less definite secondary requirement: The foreign company's activity
within the would-be taxing state must be sufficiently substantial to war-
rant the imposition of the hidden costs of tax reporting and tax law
compliance. The appearance of this quantitative nexus criterion may
be traced to the realization that a loosening of the qualitative restraints
on state tax jurisdiction has, for smaller companies, created burdens
that outweigh the need for making interstate business bear its fair share
of the cost of local government.260 In other words, the Supreme
Court, by indicating that sales plus some transient corporate presence
in the state of sale would be a sufficient basis for tax jurisdiction- 7 -
and thereby loosening the qualitative jurisdictional requirements-has
imposed hardships upon smaller businesses with only marginal sales
268. Assembly Interim Comm. on Revenue and Taxation, Selected Problems in
Taxation, in 1 APPENDIX To TH JOURNAL OF THE. ASSEMBLY 33, 37 (1967).
269. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
473-75 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
270. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959).
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and transient in-state presence in the would-be taxing state. The hard-
ship is alleviated if some minimum of transient presence is made pre-
requisite to the exercise of state income tax jurisdiction.
More and more states are adopting a uniform income base, together
with uniform and simplified reporting requirements. The future may pos-
sibly see the adoption, through an organization such as the Multistate
Tax Commission, of a centralized state tax return filing, auditing, re-
viewing and tax collecting system. Consequently, the problem of small
interstate businesses confronted by overlapping, conflicting and other-
wise burdensome state tax reporting and compliance requirements may,
for practical purposes, disappear.2 71 But so long as state revenue-gath-
ering efforts through net income taxes imposed on out-of-state busi-
nesses with marginal in-state contacts remain significant, and so long as
the aforementioned uniformity and centralization of state tax bases and
compliance mechanisms remain beyond the horizon, a practical solution
to the dilemma of small interstate enterprise remains a most urgent goal.
A. Proposed Solutions
1. Federal Proposals
Federal lawmakers have recognized the problem, but they have
not been able to agree upon a solution. In a discussion presupposing
the use of a sales or gross receipts factor in a state apportionment for-
mula, the 1964-1965 House Report considered a proposal requiring
a minimum amount of in-state gross receipts before a foreign, out-of-
state based corporation that fails to meet the qualitative exemption re-
quirements of Public Law 86-272 could be subjected to state in-
come tax.2 72  However, the House Report also found that the "gross
receipts" or "sales factor" test based on sales destination, as used in
many states' division-of-income or apportionment formulae, posed sig-
271. Repeated congressional efforts to legislate further in the state tax area stem
from the notion of many Congressmen and Senators that "IT]he future [does not]
hold out any prospect of improvement. The number of income tax jurisdictions in-
creases. Laws seem to become more complex rather than less....
"Fifty years ago, as the first of the States adopted the income tax, forward-looking
tax men warned of the dangers of each State taxing interstate commerce in its own way.
For 50 years, State tax administrators have been discussing ways of achieving sim-
plicity and uniformity. One proposal after another has been formulated, discussed, re-
vised, and in spite of the expenditure of enormous efforts, discarded. And, today, the
States appear to be as far from a solution as they have ever been. In short, the history of
50 years of State income taxation leaves no room for optimism that the States will be
any more successful in the future than they have been in the past." 1 H.R. REP. No.
1480, supra note 1, at 599.
272. Id. at 508-13.
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nificant compliance and enforcement problems.2 71 It further found,
as far as state revenue consequences were concerned, that there
would be little loss of tax revenues to market states if a two-factor ap-
portionment formula (property and payroll) were to be used in place
of the traditional three-factor formula (property, payroll and gross re-
ceipts).274 It therefore struck a questionable blow for simplicity in
proposing a two-factor (property and payroll) apportionment formula
together with purely qualitative ("business location") jurisdictional
rules and ignored its own discussion of quantitative standards in the
final legislative recommendations.
In 1965 Professor Hellerstein analyzed the 1964-65 House
Report and its recommendations. He raised substantial questions con-
cerning both the validity of the report's conclusion on revenue con-
sequences and the merits of eliminating the gross receipts factor from
state income apportionment formulae. His analysis resurrected the
discussion of a quantitative minimum nexus standard for net income
tax jurisdiction and recommended its serious consideration by Con-
gress .27  Nevertheless, neither House Bill 11798 nor its successor
bills offered a quantitative minimum nexus approach of the sort that
would eliminate the compliance and enforcement problems for small
companies doing a small volume of business in several states.277
2. Multistate Tax Compact
The states, individually and collectively, have been equally slow in
responding to compliance and enforcement problems left unsolved by
existing qualitative nexus standards. The first concrete attempt on the
part of the states to reduce compliance costs of small interstate tax-
273. 4 id. at 1126-28, 1144-45.
274. 1 id. at 560-63; 4 id. at 1150.
275. 4 id. at 1133-34, 1144-58.
276. See Hellerstein, Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation of Interstate Busi-
ness, 20 TAx L. REV. 259, 267-77 (1965).
277. However, the following types of corporations, among others, are excluded
from the effect of the congressional limitation on jurisdiction: transportation, utility,
insurance, financial companies, and corporations with an annual taxable income, for
federal tax purposes, exceeding $1 million. H.R. 7906, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13-19
(1970). The effect of this "quantitative limit" on the availablity of the federal protec-
tion under House Bill 7906 is hardly responsive to the needs of small business. Assum-
ing arguendo that "average annual income for Federal tax purposes" represents two per-
cent of total gross sales, the protection provided by the bill would be available to cor-
porations with as much as $50 million in aggregate gross sales. Using H.R. REP. No.
1480's net profit estimate for manufacturers (12 percent), one would still find compa-
nies with gross sales over $8 million to whom the bill's protections are available.
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payers was article II, paragraph 2 of the Multistate Tax Compact.2
The compact does not provide jurisdictional standards, but does at-
tempt to use the notion of minimum quantitative nexus to reduce com-
pliance costs. This provision would allow a taxpayer subject to a
state's taxing jurisdiction solely on the basis of sales activity within the
state to elect to pay a tax based on a specified percentage of its gross
receipts from sales made within the taxing jurisdiction instead of the
state's income tax, provided gross receipts from sales made in that jur-
isdiction do not exceed $100,000 during the applicable tax year.
The purpose of the provision was obviously to simplify the small out-
of-state taxpayer's net income tax record-keeping, reporting and other
compliance problems. As of mid-1970, of the 20 states that had un-
conditionally adopted the compact or parts thereof, 8 have adopted
the small-taxpayer option-as has 1 nonmember state. Seven have ef-
fectuated the option through the adoption of specified optional gross
sales tax rates.
2 79
The chief problem with the compact's small taxpayer option is
that it alleviates one burden by imposing another: the burden of as-
certaining which option will most effectively minimize taxes. In
order to satisfy itself that it is not paying an unreasonably large tax in
278. "Each party State or any subdivision thereof which imposes an income tax
shall provide by law that any taxpayer required to file a return, whose only activities
within the taxing jurisdiction consist of sales and do not include owning or renting real
estate or tangible personal property, and whose dollar volume of gross sales made dur-
ing the tax year within the State or subdivision, as the case may be, is not in excess of
$100,000 may elect to report and pay any tax on the basis of a percentage of such
volume and shall adopt rates which shall produce a tax which reasonably approximates
the tax otherwise due. The Multistate Tax Commission, not more than once in five
years, may adjust the $100,000 figure in order to reflect such changes as may occur in
the real value of the dollar, and such adjusted figure, upon adoption by the Commission,
shall replace the $100,000 figure specifically provided herein. Each party State and
subdivision thereof may make the same election available to taxpayers additional to
those specified in this paragraph." P-H STATE & LocAL TAXEs, ALL STATEs UNrr
1 6313 (1968).
279. The member states which have adopted the small taxpayer option and their
rate of tax on in-state gross sales are as follows: Alaska (no rate set); Arkansas (no
rate set); Colorado, 1% (1969); Hawaii (no rate set); Idaho, 1% (1969); Illinois
(no rate set); Kansas (no rate set); Michigan, special formula (total Michigan sales
times ratio of operational net income to total sales per federal income tax return
or 2/5% of total Michigan sales (1967)); Missouri (no rate set); Montana (no rate
set); Nebraska, special formula (product of corporate income tax times business in-
come times gross sales in or into Nebraska, all divided by gross sales (1969)); New
Mexico, 1/2% (1969); North Dakota, up to $20,000, 6/10%; $20,000-$55,000, 8/10%;
over $55,000, 1% (1969); Oregon, 1/4% (but if return on sales is less than 5% then
gross sales tax rate is 1/8% (1969); Utah, 1/2% (1969). Maine, although not a
member state, adopted the option in 1969 at 1%. Id. at 5105.
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relation to local business with similar gross sales, the out-of-state tax-
payer will probably calculate its effective tax both under the com-
pact's option and under the otherwise applicable net income tax. It will
then file under whichever method results in a lower tax. Even if the
taxpayer makes only a rough estimate of its potential net income tax
in the option state, the existence of the option may not have substan-
tially served its purpose; it would still necessitate the tax law research,
tax computation and other associated compliance costs which, it is
hoped, a small taxpayer quantitative minimum nexus requirement
would eliminate.
A more recent approach by a Multistate Tax Commission Ad
Hoc Committee likewise reflects an overzealous concern over the com-
plete loss of income tax revenues from a large number of smaller tax-
payers. The Ad Hoc Committee's plan (which was intended as a
compromise alternative to the Rodino Bill 28 0), as first proposed at a
special Multistate Tax Commission meeting in June 1970, would have
adopted the Public Law 86-272 qualitative jurisdictional stand-
ards. 1  Pursuant to changes suggested at the regular July meeting of
the commission, a quantitative test, to be superimposed on the Public
Law 86-272 jurisdictional standards, 82 was put before the com-
mission members at the October 1970 meeting. The Ad Hoc Com-
mittee's jurisdictional proposal, however, is no more than a self-serving
effort by the states to remove the unwarranted state tax exemption
provided to numerous large companies by Public Law 86-272. The
proposal does nothing to grant relief to smaller corporations for which
compliance with the formalistic criteria of Public Law 86-272 is it-
self a substantial cost burden.
3. The Huff Proposal
In this writer's opinion, the most effective and desirable plan yet
280. H.R. 7906, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
281. 31 CCH STATE TAX REV. No. 24, at 2 (June 16, 1970).
282. The jurisdictional standards of the Ad Hoc committee's plan are: "Sec. 101.
Jurisdictional Standards. (a) Income Tax-For the purpose of imposition of a net in-
come tax by any state, or political subdivision thereof, it shall be conclusively pre-
sumed that a corporation has not derived any income from within a state, or political
subdivision thereof, in any taxable year if that state or political subdivision is denied the
power under Public Law 86-272 to impose a net income tax on that corporation; pro-
vided that any state or political subdivision may impose, on any corporation or affiliated
group exempt solely by reason of Public Law 86-272, a net income tax with respect to
any taxable year in which that corporation or affiliated group has derived more than
$300,000 in gross sales in that state or political subdivision if the total sales of such
corporation or affiliated group for that year and for each of the three next preceeding
years exceeded $2,000,000. [Footnotes omitted.]"
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proposed for the elimination of substantial small business compliance
costs through the legislative prescription of minimum quantitative nexus
standards was suggested by Martin Huff, Executive Officer of the Cali-
fornia Franchise Tax Board. While testifying before the California As-
sembly Revenue and Taxation Committee on an alternative to Public
Law 86-272 and the Willis Bill then before Congress,2" 3 Mr. Huff
proposed an express exemption from California's corporate income tax
283. Statement by Martin Huff, Executive Officer of the Franchise Tax Board, en-
titled Bank and Corporation Tax Law Jurisdictional Standards, presented to the Cali-
fornia Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee during Hearings on H.R. 16491 at
San Diego, California, on November 17, 1966 (mimeograph on file with the Hastings
Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Martin Huff]:
"(a) No corporation shall be subject to the tax imposed by this part upon net
income derived from sources within this State from interstate commerce if
such corporation:
(1) is a manufacturer, producer, fabricator or vendor of tangible personal
property;
(2) does not maintain a permanent business establishment within this State;
and
(3) the combined total gross receipts of such corporation and of its affiliates
for the income year from sales made within this State do not exceed
$100,000.
"(b) For purposes of this section-
(1) The term 'does not maintain a permanent business establishment' means
that the person or its affiliates do not have:
(A) Real or tangible personal property located within the State or
political subdivision, except that which is directly connected with
and used in sales activities; or
(B) Employees permanently located within the state or political sub-
division. For purposes of this subdivision an employee means
(i) any officer or a corporation, or (ii) any individual who, under
the usual common-law rules applicable in determining the em-
ployer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee.
(2) The term 'sales made within the state or political subdivision,' means
sales of tangible personal property if the property is delivered or shipped
to a purchaser or to the designee of the purchaser within the state, re-
gardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of sale.
(3) The term 'affiliate' as used in subsection (a) means a corporation which
owns or controls, directly or indirectly, or is owned or controlled di-
rectly or indirectly by a person as defined in subsection (b), or is
related to such person, directly or indirectly, through ownership or
control by another person. For purposes of this subdivision direct or
indirect ownership or control of more than 50 percent of voting stock
shall constitute ownership or control.
(4) The term 'person' means any individual, firm, partnership, association,
corporation, company, syndicate, estate, trust or organization of any
kind, trustee, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, executor, administrator,
or assignee.
"(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply with respect to any corporation
which is incorporated or qualified to do business under the laws of this State."
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for all out-of-state based manufacturers, producers, fabricators or
vendors of tangible personal property that do not maintain a permanent
place of business in California (other than offices essential to their in-
terstate selling activities) and are not incorporated or qualified to do
business in this state, provided the particular company's annual gross
sales in California is $100,000 or less.2 8 4  The limitation of the ex-
emption to sellers of tangible personal property not incorporated or
qualfied to do business in California and having no permanent place
of business in this state reflects a recognition that quantitative minima
ought not to be applicable to qualitatively local business. 28 5  The
limit on the dollar amount of annual in-state sales necessary for exemp-
tion reflects the notion that
compliance cost as to sales below this amount may be unreason-
able in relation to the tax liability. In arriving at this arbitrary
amount, it is assumed that the net margin of profit is 5 percent and
that sales in this State are the only significant activity. If this is
so, the tax of such a corporation in most cases will be approxi-
mately $100280 under existing California tax rates.
Because the tax on sales of $100,000 or less in most instances
will be less than $100, it is suggested that if sales of such amounts
are exempted, small businesses will know in advance the extent
of the activities in which they can engage in this State before they
will incur a State income tax liability.2
87
Mr. Huff proposed such voluntary quantitative tax jurisdictional
restraint for consideration by this state's legislature "if P.L. 86-272
284. Id. at 11-14.
285. Id. at 13. Thus even small multistate business, if it engages in sufficient lo-
cal activities aside from its sales effort or has property in this state aside from a sales
office, will be taxable on the theory that the more localized its activities the more it
competes with local business at a competitive disadvantage. Mr. Huff did not suggest
what standards should determine whether a foreign seller maintains "a permanent place
of business in this state, other than offices which are essential to its interstate selling
activities ...... Id. at 12. But the fact that the proposal was limited to "those busi-
nesses which are not . . . qualified to engage in local business activities under the laws
of this state" may indicate that the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax standard of
"doing business' (supra note 9), properly qualified to allow the permitted sales office
and selling activities, would provide a guide. See id. See also the standard of "business
location" in H.R. 7906, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 511 (1970).
286. This amount was arrived at as follows: "This allocation factor of such cor-
porations will consist of only a single factor-that is, a sales factor. Thus under the al-
location factor, in effect one-third of the income from its California sales is attributable
to California; therefore, the total sales which are treated as having occurred in Cali-
fornia is $33,333. If the net profit is 5 percent, the income subject to tax will be .05
times $33,333, or $1,666.65. Under existing tax rates, the tax due upon this amount is
5.5 percent times $1,666.65, or $91.66." Martin Huff, supra note 283, at 13.
287. Id. at 14.
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can be repealed or if jurisdictional standards contained in the Willis
Bill are replaced by more flexible and reasonable standards." Mr.
Huff noted that states could not be expected voluntarily to curtail their
jurisdiction "so long as P.L. 86-272 is operative and serves to ex-
enpt from state income tax multistate businesses with annual sales in ex-
cess of $7,000,000."'28"
The quantitative minimum suggested above could be implemented
using very simple reporting requirements for any company making
any more than isolated sales to customers in the taxing state.28 9  The
availability of such a simplified suggested information return would
enable the company to know with certainty whether it has met the tax-
ing state's legal requirements. It would also assure the taxing state
that the identity of all but the most brazen or uninformed potential
taxpayers would regularly be available for audit and investigation pur-
poses. The law's reporting requirements should be complemented by
appropriate statutes of limitations, and by audit procedures and penal-
ties for misstatement or omissions to encourage honesty in reporting.
The quantitative formula proposed by Martin Huff does present
certain conceptual problems. The first has to do with the use of the
288. Id.
289. Perhaps isolated sales involving insubstantial gross receipts would in any case
fail to meet the "regular and substantial income producing activity" test of constitu-
tional law. Thus truly "isolated and occasional" sellers could simply rely on the existing
constitutional protection afforded foreign, out-of-state corporations having contacts with
the taxing state which are quantitatively insufficient under the theory of Miller Bros.
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). If a foreign corporation feels uncer-
tain as to whether its activities are quantitatively insufficient it would be well advised to
file the information return.
The out-of-state seller's filing of a simplified information return would be a condi-
tion to the assurance that the state will not later seek to exert its tax jurisdictional reach
under the uncertain state of the law as it now exists.
Under this simplified information return, the foreign, out-of-state based company
could be required to list the following: its exact name, its legal domicile, the date of its
incorporation, the address of its principal office, the industries or lines of business in
which it is engaged, a complete description of the activities of its employees in Cali-
fornia, the dollar amount attributable to gross receipts from sales made to customers in
California during the reporting period, and the names and addresses of its ten largest
customers in this state. The information return could also provide for the out-of-state
seller's affirmation, under penalty of perjury, that it provided no personal services in this
state (other than sales related services which would be allowed under this law and would
be clearly enumerated in the instruction sheet to the information return) and that it
owned no property and maintained no inventory in this state other than that permitted
under the law. E.g., the sales office and such major items as delivery vehicles and a
limited inventory for the making of in-state over-the-counter sales such as those sug-
gested in this article, and that it engaged in no other activities which would be specifi-
cally prohibited by law.
March 19711 JURISDICTIONAL CONTACTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
gross receipts from in-state sales as the relevant measure for determin-
ing when a business has satisfied the quantitative nexus requirements.
The second problem involves the location of the dividing line be-
tween businesses which do or do not fall below the minmum quanti-
tative nexus. The last concerns a state constitutional problem peculiar
to California and to several of its sister states.
a) PROBLEMS WITH THE GROSS RECEIPTS YARDSTICK
The use of gross receipts as the measure for determining the quan-
tity of income-producing activity obscures the obvious fact that dif-
ferent taxpayers in the same industry-and, even more significant, dif-
ferent industries-operate on different profit margins.29 °  The reason
for using gross receipts as the measure of quantitative presence is that
this enables foreign taxpayers to ascertain the amount of their in-
state sales with relative ease.
A weighted average margin of profitability could be determined on
the basis of empirical data for those taxpayers likely to fall into the
category of protected interstate sellers. While benefiting some tax-
payers or industries more than others, such an average margin of
profitability to determine the proper gross receipts cut-off point for the
quantitative nexus standard would nevertheless be of some benefit to
every foreign, out-of-state based corporate taxpayer and would defi-
nitely benefit the interstate business community in the aggregate. A
more refined quantitative minimum nexus rule could be produced ei-
ther (1) by determining average margins of profitability applicable to
different industries and by using the same to determine different mini-
mum in-state gross receipts requirements for tax jurisdiction over cor-
porations in such different industries or (2) by relying on the report-
ing companies to indicate their own margin of profitability with sup-
porting data and by establishing a sliding scale of gross receipts juris-
dictional cut-off points based on varying margins of profitability.29'
It should be noted, however, that too much detail and sophistication in
determining minimum gross receipts standards may destroy the sim-
290. See 1 H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1, at 503-04, noting profit margin as a
percentage of gross sales of the multistate corporations studied ranging between zero
(or less than zero) up to 25 percent. The report notes, however, that such profit mar-
gins "may be expected to be under 4 percent for more than two-thirds of the manufactur-
ing corporations and for more than three-quarters of the wholesalers."
291. The gross receipts tax rate provided for taxpayers electing the small taxpayer
option under the Multistate Tax Compact as adopted in Oregon (1/4%, but if return
on sales is less than 5%, the rate is 1/8%) is a very simple example of the latter
alternative. See note 279 supra.
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plicity and visibility of the minimum gross receipts approach for the
community of small to moderate-sized interstate sellers sought to be
benefited.
b) WHERE TO SET THE LIMIT
Determination of the exact gross receipts cut-off point presents
similar problems of arbitrariness. Nevertheless, the fact that some ar-
bitrariness is involved in devising a mathematical standard ought not
to deter legislators from providing the standard if, as applied in prac-
tice, it will substantially serve the purpose for which it has been devised.
The House Report of 1964 briefly considers a suggested $100,-
000 gross receipts minimum quantitative standard.292 Using rate-of-
return on gross sales percentages ranging from 2 to 15 percent (de-
pending on whether the interstate seller's business is in the wholesale
or retail area or in manufacturing) and a 5 percent tax rate, the amount
of tax of the interstate company having approximately $100,000 in an-
nual gross receipts (which would be forfeited by the taxing state under
a $100,000 quantitative minimum) would range from $33 at the 2
percent rate-of-return level to $250 at the 15 percent rate-of-return lev-
el. -93  When the tax thus potentially forfeited by a state adopting a
$100,000 gross receipts quantitative minimum nexus rule is compared
to the House Report's estimate of $93 as the median of the range of
total cost of compliance with state income tax provisions for compa-
nies grossing from $50,000 to $200,000, it seems that Mr. Justice
Frankfurter was correct when he stated that subjecting small or mod-
erate-sized corporations doing interstate business spread over several
states to different income tax record-keeping and compliance require-
ments in each of the several states "may well exceed the burden of the
taxes themselves. ' 294 Regardless of the fairness or accuracy of existing
apportionment formulae or specific allocation rules, they fail to ap-
portion or allocate the cost of tax law compliance. The problem is not
unfair apportionment or allocation, but tax rates that do not reflect the
burden of multiple compliance. By gearing the small interstate tax-
payer exemption to the same order of magnitude as total state tax com-
pliance cost, at least the more blatant instances of effective multiple
taxation through hidden compliance cost would seem to be alleviated.
292. The report notes that "the $100,000 figure has been selected fairly arbitrarily.
." 1 H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 1, at 508.
293. Id.
294. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 473-75
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Any cut-off point chosen would provide some relief to small inter-
state taxpayers, since no relief exists at present.
c) CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
The final problem with the Huff proposal involves article XII,
section 15 of the Constitution of the State of California, which pro-
vides:
No corporation organized outside the limits of this State shall be al-
lowed to transact business within this State on more favorable con-
ditions than are prescribed by law to similar corporations organized
under the laws of this State.
The problem is whether enactment of a tax jurisdictional standard pre-
scribing a quantitative minimum nexus measured by gross receipts at-
tributable to California activities would run afoul of this constitutional
prohibition. The simplest answer to such a potential constitutional
conflict would be a determination by the California Legislature that
quantitative minimum nexus standards are constitutionally required un-
der the commerce or due process implications of the Supreme Court's
Northwestern States line of decisions.2 95 Such California legislative
action, declarative of existing United States constitutional law in terms
designed to reduce existing confusion among taxpayers and state tax
administrators as to the legal responsibilities of interstate taxpayers with
quantitatively marginal California contacts, would be a creative alter-
native to the congressional intervention suggested by Justice Frank-
furter.296 The possible contention that the California Legislature
cannot make this determination under the prohibitory mandate of ar-
ticle XII, section 15 should be rejected. In exercising its lawmaking
function in this area the legislature must look not only to article XII,
section 15, but also to the basic constitutional source of its power to
tax corporations. 297  In reconciling any possible conflict, the legisla-
295. Cases cited note 3 supra.
296. 358 U.S. at 473-75 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
297. "[T]he legislature may provide by law for the taxation of corporations, their
franchises, or any other franchises, by any method not prohibited by this Constitution
or the Constitution or laws of the United States." CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 16, cl. 2.
Thus, in considering the "method" of its taxing measures, the legislature must look not
only to California's Constitution, but also to that of the United States.
The fact that "[tihe legislature shall pass all laws necessary for the enforcement of
the provisions of [article XII]" (CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 24) would seem to give
further force to the proposition that the legislature has some interpretive discretion, es-
pecially where potential legislation may skirt conflicting constitutional demands, al-
lowing a legislative declaration that the suggested quantitative nexus standard legislation
is constitutionally "necessary" under article XIII, section 16, and not prohibited by ar-
ticle XII, section 15.
[Vol. 221110
ture ought to exercise the broad discretion inherent in the notion of
legislative power-the discretion and power to find facts298 upon
which to declare the public policy of this state299 and the necessity,
expediency and reasonableness of legislative means and methods to
further such policy. 00
An examination of the effect of the double-barreled approach
of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Law301 clearly indicates
that the legislature has recognized certain reasonable and constitution-
ally required distinctions between foreign and domestic corpora-
tions. 302 For purposes of corporate taxation, California's franchise
and corporation income tax statutes distinguish between (1) corpo-
rations, both domestic and foreign, "doing business within the limits
of this state" and thus subject to the Bank and Corporation Franchise
Taxs03 and (2) corporations, both domestic and foreign, not "doing
business with this state, but deriving income from sources within the
state and thus subject to the corporation income tax.304 Language
equivalent to the article XII, section 15 criterion-"to transact busi-
ness within this State"-is employed as the jurisdictional criterion only
under the franchise tax and not under the corporation income tax.305
298. See Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal. 2d 83, 90, 113 P.2d 873, 877 (1941).
299. See Wilson v. Waiters, 19 Cal. 2d 111, 115, 119 P.2d 340, 343 (1941); Carr
v. Kingsbury, 111 Cal. App. 165, 168, 275 P. 586, 587-88, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 641
(1931).
300. See Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 285-86, 298 P. 481,
484 (1931).
301. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23101.
302. See id. The California Legislature's power to draw such distinctions through
varying jurisdictional standards can hardly be questioned. See Oliver Continuous Filter
Co. v. McColgan, 48 Cal. App. 2d 800, 804, 120 P.2d 782, 785 (1942). Furthermore, it
has never been held that article XII, section 15 of the California Constitution prevented
such reasonable distinctions from being made. See Francioni v. Soledad Land & Water
Co., 170 Cal. 221, 225, 149 P. 161, 163 (1915).
303. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 23151.
304. Id. § 23501. This latter category of corporations subject only to corpora-
tion income tax may in turn be subdivided into (a) corporations deriving income from
the passive ownership of some property which has locus or situs in this state and (b)
corporations deriving income from "activities in this State" even though such corpora-
tions are not "doing business" in this state (intrastate business) but are solely "enxgaged in
carrying on business between this state and other states or countries. . ." exclusively in
foreign or interstate commerce. These latter corporations are not subject to the fran-
chise tax, but only to the corporation income tax on that portion of their income at-
tributable to property with locus or situs in this state or to business activities in this
state. See CAL. AD. CODE tit. 18, ch. 3, subch. 3, Reg. 23040(a).
305. The phrase "to transact business within this State" as used in section 15 has
been held to be the equivalent of the phrase "to do business" as found in many state stat-
utes prohibiting a foreign corporation from "doing business" in the State until the cor-
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It may be argued, therefore, that legislative treatment of corporations
over which California obtains jurisdiction under the looser nexus stand-
ards30 6 of the latter taxing measure is not restricted by article XII, sec-
tion 15. The fact that the corporation income tax, with one excep-
tion,30 7 reaches only foreign corporations not doing business in Cali-
fornia provides further support to that argument.
3 08
The activities which, if kept under a certain quantitative mini-
mum, would be permitted to the interstate seller in California under the
Huff proposal have consistently been deemed sufficient only for Cali-
fornia corporation income tax jurisdictional purposes.30 9 California
has never squarely confronted the issue whether such activities would
poration has properly qualified with that jurisdiction's Secretary of State or equivalent
officer. General Conference of Free Baptists v. Berkey, 156 Cal. 466, 469, 105 P. 411,
412 (1909). In the Berkey case the California Supreme Court referred to Civil Code
sections 405-08 as the equivalent of California "doing business" statutes. Civil Code
section 405 has been repealed and its subject matter is now covered by Corporations
Code sections 6201-03, 6400, 6401, and 6403. Corporation Code section 6203 defines
the phrase to "transact intrastate business" as meaning the "entering into repeated and
successive transactions of its business in the State, other than interstate or foreign com-
merce." It would likewise seem to be the equivalent of the constitutional language "to
transact business within this State."
306. See text accompanying note 304 supra.
307. The only domestic corporations taxed under the corporation income tax
rather than under the bank and corporation franchise tax are those which fall under the
exception of California Revenue and Taxation Code section 23102 which provides that:
"Any corporation holding or organized to hold stock or bonds of any other corporation
or corporations, and not trading in stock or bonds or other securities held, and engaging
in no activities other than the receipt and disbursement of dividends from stock or in-
terest from bonds, is not a corporation doing business in this State for the purpose of
[the bank and corporation franchise tax]."
The legislative reason for making such domestic corporations subject to the cor-
poration income tax law may be found in the California Supreme Court decision of
Union Oil Ass'n v. Johnson, 2 Cal. 2d 727, 736, 43 P.2d 291, 295 (1935). See I CCH
STATE TAX REP., CAL. 10-203 (1969).
308. Thus, not only does the corporation income tax use a lesser jurisdictional
nexus standard than would arguably be necessary to invoke article XII, section 15, but
also of the two distinct statutory subdivisions of that jurisdictional standard (CAL. REV.
& TAx. CODE § 23040), one, deriving income "from any activities carried on in this
state, ... is applicable solely to foreign corporations. Setting a distinct jurisdictional
criterion designed to reach only foreign corporations would seem to support an implicit
legislative determination that certain classes of foreign corporations cannot or need not
be governed by the same standards applicable to domestic corporations.
309. Thus activities which included authority "to receive payments on orders taken
[by West's salesmen], to collect delinquent accounts, and to make adjustments in case of
complaints by customers, [using] space in the offices of attorneys in return for the use
of [West's] books stored in such offices [and advertising in local newspapers and
periodicals] as its local offices those occupied by its employees," were considered suffi-
cient for corporate net income tax jurisdiction. West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27
Cal. 2d 705, 707, 166 P.2d 861, 862 (1946).
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be sufficient to reach a foreign corporation under the franchise tax
law.
310
It could therefore be argued that quantitative minimum nexus
legislation-which only limits the applicability of corporation income
tax law's qualitative jurisdictional standard-would discriminate solely
among different categories of foreign corporations under the reach of
the corporation income tax whose qualitative jurisdictional standards
do not trigger the criterion for applying article XII, section 15 of the
California Constitution. No discrimination between domestic and for-
eign corporations "doing business within the limits of this state," would
be introduced into the corporation franchise tax to impair its constitu-
tionality under article XII, section 15.311
d) EFFECT ON CALIFORNIA'S REVENUE
In addition to the potential technical problems which might be
raised by the Huff proposal, its effect on California corporate income
tax receipts ought to be noted. The proposed minimum quantitative
standard of $100,000 in gross receipts would cause California to suf-
fer only a minimal loss of revenue. For purposes of simplicity, as-
suming that a 5 percent profit margin represents a fairly accurate ap-
proximation of the actual profit margin of the weighted mean of all
foreign, out-of-state based corporate taxpayers reporting net income for
California tax purposes,312 such a quantitative minimum would elimi-
nate California corporate income taxes for all those foreign, out-of-
state taxpayers reporting $5,000 or less in California net taxable in-
come. During the 1968 income year, out of 1,936 out-of-state cor-
porations filing corporate net income tax returns, 1,267 reported
losses or net taxable income of less than $5,000."' These same cor-
porations paid a total of slightly over $90,000 in California corporate
310. The court in West Publishing probably failed to mention the Bank and Cor-
poration Franchise Tax Act because it was unnecessary to reach the decision. It is sug-
gested that the Huff proposal can avoid California constitutional conflict by consistent
judicial and administrative interpretations holding the sales-related activity of the type
found in West Publishing and suggested by Mr. Huff, while it is clearly sufficient for
corporation income tax jurisdictional nexus, is not the equivalent of "doing business" as
that term may be employed for purposes of Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax juris-
diction. See notes 283 & 309 supra.
311. Matson Navigation Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 2 Cal. 2d 1, 5, 11, 43
P.2d 805, 807, 810 (1935), aff'd, 297 U.S. 441 (1936).
312. See note 290 supra.
313. CALIFORNIA FRANcHcs TAX BoARD, ANNUAL REPORT 1969, at 104, table 6
(1969).
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net income taxes.314 This amounts to less than 3.3 percent of the total
corporate income taxes315 and to less than .02 percent of the total of
corporate income and franchise taxes316 paid in that income year.
Any revenue loss from foreign, out-of-state corporations who
would be taken out of the tax-paying category would probably be
eliminated entirely-in fact, added revenues would probably be gained-
if the minimum gross receipts quantitative standard were also incor-
porated in the reverse nexus rules of California's allocation and ap-
portionment statute. 17 Thus, California could disallow assignment
of income away from this state's tax reach by those of California's
128,505 corporate taxpayers who are sufficiently present in this
state in order to have reported and paid the Bank and Corporation
Franchise Tax 1" and whose out-of-state sales activities produce less
than $100,000 in gross receipts in any other state.
This elimination of assignment of income would not be pos-
sible without amendment of Revenue Code sections 25121 and
25122.319 As previously noted, reverse nexus standards are es-
sentially a matter of California law, and are not restricted by consti-
tutional or federal criteria.320  Likewise, constitutional requirements of
fair allocation and apportionment of income to all the jurisdictions in
which a company does business are not applicable to domestic corpora-
tions to the same degree as foreign corporations. In any case, mathe-
matical exactness is not required. 32' The adoption of similar $100,000
quantitative tax jurisdictional minima by all other corporate income
taxing states would eliminate any substantial danger of multiple tax
burdens on California corporations with less than $100,000 in sales
in any other jurisdiction. Until such parallel minimum quantitative
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 87 (table 2) & 104 (table 6).
317. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 25120-39; see id. § 25101.
318. CALIFORNIA FRUCiosp- TAX BOAmD, ANNUAL REPoRT 1969, at 87, table 2
(1969).
319. See text accompanying notes 250-67 supra.
320. See text accompanying notes 258-60 supra.
321. Mathematical exactness in apportionment formulas is not a constitutional
requirement. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422 (1947) ("rough
approximation rather than precision is sufficient"). Furthermore, there are obvious
policy reasons for treating domiciliary corporations somewhat differently from foreign
corporations having only transient physical nexus with the taxing state. In essence the
argument is that the benefits and protections afforded domiciliary corporations and their
property and employees are greater than those afforded foreign corporations and that
this difference in benefit and protection creates the basis for a reasonable tax classifica-
tion distinguishing domiciliary from foreign corporations.
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nexus standards are established in other jurisdictions, a tax credit for
taxes actually paid by California corporations to other states could be
enacted to eliminate the residual possibility of double taxation of part
of California-based companies' total net corporate income where that
corporation was disallowed the right to apportion income out of the
state because its aggregated gross sales outside California are less than
$100,000.
In any case, the elimination of the most marginal two-thirds of the
taxpayers now reporting under the .California corporation income tax
would significantly reduce the paper work involved in filing and auditing
their returns. The simplified report of gross receipts and related infor-
mation under the procedure suggested above could be handled with
much greater efficiency and would provide the same basis for selective
audit and compliance checks with respect to out-of-state taxpayers as
the present full returns provide.
B. Conclusion
The following solution to the interstate tax jurisdictional problem
is therefore proposed: First, Congress should leave to the Supreme
Court the responsibility for delineating appropriate qualitative stand-
ards of state tax jurisdictional nexus requirements. These require-
ments could be defined and refined in light of the changing technology
which is likely to shape the course and methods of interstate business
in the coming decades. Second, California and other major taxing
states using the corporate net income tax should lead the way in en-
acting quantitative minimum nexus standards.
Quantitative minimum nexus standards should arise through state
self-restraint with respect to the marginal out-of-state taxpayer. Fed-
erally imposed uniformity may not be desirable and may take away
the experimental forum and innovative function whch the states can
provide in the area of income taxation. Since the integrity of state
governmental functions may depend largely on state fiscal indepen-
dence from Washington, the solution to minimizing the state income
tax burden for small interstate business should come through inde-
pendent state rather than federal action.
In light of the persistent efforts in Congress to further control
the tax jurisdictional reach of the states-which efforts come closer and
closer to success with each Congress 322 -it seems advisable that the
322. H.R. 7906 did not die quietly in the closing days of the 91st Congress. It was
sought to be amended into an omnibus bill on the Senate floor by Senator Charles
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recognized leader among the states, with respect to aggressive and sub-
stantial net income tax revenue gathering,323 take steps to correct
present deficiencies. As suggested above, a major step in this direction
would be the adoption of quantitative jurisdictional minima.
Mathias (Md.) in the hope of pressuring Senator Long into agreeing to early hearings on
the bill which will certainly be reintroduced in the 92d Congress.
323. "The State of California has been the most aggressive in its endeavors to en-
force its laws and has been most successful in obtaining compliance. As other States
either rewrite their laws (Idaho, Tennessee and Utah have already done so) or step up
their enforcement activities, many marginal firms ...will either be forced out of
business or will withdraw from the jurisdiction of some taxing states.
"As previously stated, California has been the most aggressive state in enforcement
of its laws. It is referred to in some of these examples only because of this." SENATE
SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 86TH CONG., lST SESS., STATE TAXATION ON IN-
TERSTATE COMMERCE 313 (Comm. Print 1959).
